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Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS
Leandra Lederman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tax evasion is both costly to the government and complicated to
combat.1 Even noncompliance by individuals with the federal income
tax consists of a number of distinct problems,2 though for ease of
analysis, most of it can be grouped into three general categories:3 (1)
failure to file a required tax return4 (filing noncompliance),5 (2) failure to
* Professor, George Mason University School of Law. The author is grateful to the American
Tax Policy Institute for providing a grant supporting the work on this article and to
George Mason Law School and its Law and Economics Center for research support. The author
would also like to thank Elizabeth Atkinson, Leslie Book, Bryan Camp, Mark Gergen, Calvin
Johnson, and Stephen Mazza for helpful discussions and comments on earlier versions of this article;
Mark Ascher, Ann Murphy, and Michael Wenzel for valuable comments; and Patricia Cervenka, Lee
Fennell, Mike Kelly, Sally Ann Lederman, Cyndi Lepow, Mark Newton, Clarissa Potter, John
Scholz, Suellen Wolfe, participants in the symposium sponsored by the Kansas Law Review,
participants in the DC-Area Tax Policy Workshop, and members of the Austin Tax Study Group for
helpful discussions about material covered in this article.
Most of the work on this article was done while the author was a Visiting Professor at the
University of Texas School of Law. Texas Law student Ursula Mann and George Mason Law
students Adrianna Marks, Rachel Polsky, and Mandi Scott provided valuable research assistance.
The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the American Tax Policy
Institute.
1. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION
RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND
RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, JCX-38-02, 34 (May 10, 2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 93-18
[hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT] (reporting the IRS estimate of a $166.4 billion federal
income “tax gap” for 1998). The corporate income tax gap was estimated to be another $40.5
billion. Id.
2. Some of many possible examples include falsifying information on W-4 forms, see
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-fill/fw4_03.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2003), so as to reduce withholding;
altering the tax return form itself, sometimes in subtle ways so as to mislead the IRS; see, for
example, Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 779 (1984); and fraud such as falsely swearing that
children reside with the taxpayer, so as to receive an earned income credit or increase its amount, see
Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1145,
1155 (2003).
3. The American Bar Association Commission on Taxpayer Compliance listed four categories
of noncompliance: (1) “failure to file returns;” (2) “under-reporting of income;” (3) “overstating
deductions, credits and adjustments;” and (4) “failure to pay established liabilities.” ABA COMM.
ON TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, 41 TAX
LAW. 329, 330 (1987) [hereinafter ABA COMMISSION REPORT]. The second category specified in
this article encompasses the second and third categories listed in the ABA Commission Report.
4. An IRS research study estimates that over 50 million required tax returns are not filed each
year. Only a small fraction of these cases can be worked, and most will either result in a refund to
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report on a filed return all taxes owed (reporting noncompliance),6 and
(3) failure to pay over to the government taxes admittedly owed
(payment noncompliance).7
Traditionally, enforcement has been used to combat noncompliance.8
However, Congress determined that the IRS was overzealous, and passed
the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998
(RRA ’98).9 RRA ’98 wrought enormous changes at the IRS, including
a renewed focus on taxpayer rights10 and “customer” service.11
Some have argued that a kinder, gentler IRS might increase taxpayer
willingness to pay taxes voluntarily.12 In addition, a number of scholars
the taxpayer—as a result of tax withholding or the earned income tax credit—or in little extra tax
collected.
George Guttman, What Would an Adequately Funded IRS Look Like?, 97 TAX NOTES 36, 37 (2002).
5. Cf. Alan H. Plumley, The Determinants of Individual Income Tax Compliance: Estimating
the Impacts of Tax Policy, Enforcement, and IRS Responsiveness, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
PUBL’N No. 1916, 7 (1996) (“The IRS recognizes three type of voluntary compliance: filing
compliance . . . reporting compliance . . . and payment compliance.”) (emphasis in original).
6. Cf. id.
7. Cf. id. This is an important category. See ABA Commission Report, supra note 3, at 367
(discussing the fact that 35–40% of the IRS’s delinquent accounts involve uncollected trust fund
taxes).
8. See Remarks of Shirley D. Peterson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Federal Bar
Association Tax Law Conference, Washington, D.C. (March 6, 1992), reprinted at 1992-SPG Fed.
B.A. Sec. Tax’n Rep. 1, 2 (“Traditionally, Compliance—spelled with a capital ‘C’—has meant the
enforcement activities such as examination, collection, criminal investigation, and litigation.”); cf.
Charles O. Rossotti, Modernizing America’s Tax Agency, 83 TAX NOTES 1191, 1195 (1999)
(“Historically, the IRS placed great emphasis on direct enforcement revenue, in part because it is
precisely measurable and in part because it showed an indirect deterrent effect that increases
compliance.”).
9. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 [hereinafter RRA ’98]. RRA ’98 was widely supported.
Its original co-sponsors were Representatives Benjamin L. Cardin, a Democrat, and Rob Portman, a
Republican. It ultimately had 43 co-sponsors, 19 Democrats and 24 Republicans. It passed in the
House by a vote of 402 to 8 and in the Senate by a vote of 96 to 2. Subsequent to enactment, many
of the “horror stories” recounted in the hearings were found to be unfounded or exaggerated.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, GAO REPORT ON
ALLEGATIONS OF IRS TAXPAYER ABUSE (May 24, 1999), LEXIS, 2000 TNT 80-13; see also
Conference Panel Ponders Finance Hearing Horror Stories, 83 TAX NOTES 1854, 1854 (1999).
10. See, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 §§ 3001 et. seq. (Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3, further
amended by the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999), Amendment in div. J., sec. 4002(d)-(e) at 112 Stat. 2681-906).
11. The use of the euphemism “customer” is discussed below. See infra notes 99–102 and
accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Rossotti, Modernizing America’s Tax Agency, supra note 8, at 1195
(“Historically, the IRS placed great emphasis on direct enforcement revenue . . . . However, there
are many techniques other than direct enforcement that increased compliance at the IRS and
elsewhere, such as better and more targeted taxpayer education, better reporting, voluntary
agreements, improved regulations, and earlier intervention through notices and phone calls.”); David
Cay Johnston, Tax Professionals See Pitfalls in the New I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1999, at 21
(“Joel A. Goverman, who is in charge of revising I.R.S. collection strategies, said: ‘We are
emphasizing customer service and working with the taxpayer to come to the proper resolution. . . .
[W]e believe that taking hard immediate action will result in our ending up collecting less
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have stated that enforcement does not explain the overall rate of
voluntary compliance with the individual federal income tax, generally
estimated at approximately 83%.13 That is, penalties generally amount to
20% or 75% of unpaid tax,14 which is insufficiently low to explain
compliance in economic terms,15 given that the audit rate for individuals
is below 1%.16 These scholars have argued that other factors are at play
money.’”); Oral History Interview, 14 VA. TAX REV. 429, 453 (1994) (quoting former
Commissioner Mortimer Caplin as saying “[W]e were saying, ‘How can we show that we’re getting
better compliance by this more cooperative and softer approach, this courteous approach?’”); ABA
Commission Report, supra note 3, at 354–55. (“To improve taxpayers’ cooperation with the Internal
Revenue Service and increase their willingness to comply, we recommend that the Service take a
more active role in educating taxpayers and providing assistance to those who need it. The recently
announced reorganization of the Internal Revenue Service’s structure to place greater emphasis on
taxpayer service is a promising step in this direction.”). Id.
13. See James Andreoni, et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818 (1998); cf. Robert E.
Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research Program: Measuring Taxpayer Compliance
Comprehensively, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1270 app. (2003) (estimating 84.5% rate of timely voluntary
compliance with respect to all federal taxes).
14. See I.R.C. § 6662 (20% penalty for, among other things, substantial underpayment of tax,
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations); id. § 6663(a) (75% penalty for fraud). Criminal
sanctions are rarely imposed. In 1981, for example, fewer than .1% of IRS investigations and audits
were prosecuted criminally. Jonathan Skinner & Joel Slemrod, An Economic Perspective on Tax
Evasion, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 345, 348 (1985). According to the IRS, the figure for all IRS
prosecutions for the year (including those for narcotics-related financial crimes) is in the low four
digits. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: PROGRAM, BY STATUS OR DISPOSITION FY 2002—
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (CI), at http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,id=107483,00.html (last visited
May 4, 2003); see also Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2003) (reporting more IRS data). Those figures are a
small fraction of the more than 100 million individual income tax returns filed annually. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: SUMMARY OF NUMBER OF RETURNS, BY TYPE OF RETURN, FISCAL
YEARS 2000 AND 2001 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/01db02nr.xls (last visited
Apr. 1, 2003); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: PROJECTIONS OF RETURNS TO BE FILED IN CALENDAR
YEARS 2001-2008 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08rs01pr.pdf (last visited Apr.
1, 2003).
15. That is, the expected sanction of any particular tax evader is very low, so a rational taxpayer
comparing the costs of compliance with the expected costs of evasion would find compliance
irrational, absent extreme risk aversion or other idiosyncratic factors. Lederman, supra note 14.
16. In fiscal year 2000, the overall audit rate for individuals was .49%. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, STATEMENT BY IRS COMMISSIONER CHARLES O. ROSSOTTI ON AUDIT AND COLLECTION
ACTIVITY FOR FISCAL 2000 (Feb. 15, 2001), LEXIS, 2001 TNT 33-11 [hereinafter AUDIT AND
COLLECTION ACTIVITY STATISTICS FOR FISCAL 2000]. For individuals with $100,000 or more of
income it was .96%. Id. Both of these audit rates declined every year between 1996 and 2000. See
id.; see also infra note 73.
These figures reflect only IRS contacts with taxpayers that are officially categorized as
audits. However, math error notices and return matching are similar to correspondence audits. See
JAMES R. WHITE, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: IRS AUDIT RATES (Apr. 2001), LEXIS, 2001 TNT 105-31. Counting
as audits a wider variety of IRS contacts would increase the figures substantially but they would
nonetheless remain low. See George Guttman, Current Audit Statistics Make IRS Look Less

974

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

in determining tax compliance.17 They have looked to such things as
taxpayer morale,18 trust in government,19 and the use of tax compliance
as a signal.20
In fact, this simple comparison of relatively high rates of voluntary
compliance rates with relatively low audit rates and penalties is flawed
because it does not account for the role of information reporting and
withholding in constraining the opportunity to evade tax.21 Withholding
essentially puts third parties in charge of paying the taxpayer’s taxes to
the IRS22 and eases the psychological burden that would be associated
with writing a check for the full year’s taxes to send in with the tax

Effective Than It Is, 90 TAX NOTES 1593, 1597 (2001) (overall audit rate for 1999 would increase
from .89% to 3.8%).
17. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1942 & n.169 (1987) (asserting that “[i]t
seems reasonable” to attribute some compliance unexplained by the economic model to such things
as the “moral and social costs of dishonesty and the transaction costs of enduring an audit”); Robert
Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Norms & Corporate Law: Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in
Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1725 (2001) (“[T]he punishment for tax evasion in most countries,
discounted by the probability of prosecution and conviction, is small relative to the gain. Whereas
economic models of self-interest predict low rates of tax compliance, some countries, like the U.S.
and Switzerland, enjoy high rates of tax compliance.”); Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating?
A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 377 (2002) (“Tax
compliance rates—which vary dramatically across nations—seem to bear no connection to
enforcement levels. For example, tax cheats face a much higher expected penalty in many European
nations than they do in the United States, yet the United States enjoys a higher compliance rate.”);
Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782
(2000) (“A widespread view among tax scholars holds that law enforcement does not explain why
people pay taxes.”).
18. See Bruno S. Frey & Lars P. Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical
Analysis at 7; CESifo Working Paper Series No. 760 (Aug. 2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/
so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=341380 (empirical analysis in their paper “offers a perspective seldom
taken into consideration with regard to the issue of tax compliance: Deterrence is only one of the
motivational forces in getting people to pay their taxes. Quite another is the set of policies available
to the tax authority to bolster taxpayers’ morale.”).
19. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated, Univ. of
Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ. Working Paper No. 322 (2002); see generally Frey &
Feld, supra note 18.
20. See Posner, supra note 17, at 1782.
21. Cf. Kent W. Smith, Integrating Three Perspectives on Compliance: A Sequential Decision
Model, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 350, 359 (1990) (“A general conclusion from the large amount of
research on deterrence effects is that deterrence factors generally evidence weaker effects than do
normative orientations and expectations of significant others . . . . Most studies, however, have not
controlled for the subjective importance of the decisions or such situational factors as structural
opportunity that may affect the fullness of the analytical decision process.”) (citations omitted).
22. Although withholding is very effective, it does not provide a 100% payment rate.
Employee withholding can be evaded through submission of incorrect W-4 forms. Employers also
sometimes fail to pay over employee withholding to the IRS. See infra text accompanying notes
170–171. Some employers set up systems to facilitate intentional evasion of employment tax
responsibilities. See Christopher Bergen, CID to Employment Tax Evaders: “We Will Catch You,”
(May 11, 2001), LEXIS, 2001 TNT 94-9.
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return.23 Information returning matching can be viewed as an invisible
audit—but it is not counted in audit rate statistics.24
Information reporting also deters noncompliance,25 as well as
facilitating collection of delinquent taxes.26 Thus, it may not be
surprising that “voluntary” compliance27 rates are much higher for the
23. John Carroll describes a phenomenon in which taxpayers care primarily about whether they
will get a refund with their return or owe more tax. John S. Carroll, How Taxpayers Think about
Their Taxes: Frames and Values, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 49 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). In
addition, individuals tend to be risk-averse with respect to choosing among gains (such as possible
amounts of tax refunds) but risk-seeking with respect to choosing among losses (such as possible
amounts of tax payments). See Michael W. Spicer, Civilization at a Discount: The Problem of Tax
Evasion, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 13, 18 (1986) (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The
Psychology of Preferences, SCI. AM. 100 (Jan. 1982)). People will also accept more risk to avoid a
loss than to obtain a gain. Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Beyond Deterrence: Behavioral Decision
Theory and Tax Compliance, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 821, 824 (1991). Both of these phenomena
suggest that taxpayers in a refund position will take less risk (and therefore are less likely to cheat)
than taxpayers in a balance due position.
Carroll raises the possibility of expanding the withholding system and paying interest on
overwithholding to increase the sense of fairness and encourage people to err on the side that favors
the government. Carroll, supra, at 49. However, this raises several concerns. First, the payment of
interest might encourage taxpayers to use the federal government as a bank. That could be solved by
paying a below-market rate of interest. However, that might even increase the sense of unfairness,
by emphasizing the impression that withheld taxes properly belong to the taxpayer rather than to the
government. That view might create upward pressure on the interest rate. Second, if interest were
paid only on withholding and not on refundable credits such as the earned income credit, the refund
would have to be allocated, which might increase the error rate in the interest calculation. Third, the
payment of interest might encourage taxpayers to file late. This could be addressed by only paying
interest to those who timely file or by cutting interest off at April 15 or a set date after April 15.
Finally, at the margin, interest payments might encourage taxpayers to cheat by raising the amount at
stake with respect to any taxes saved. However, that effect is not clear because of individual riskaversion with respect to gains. See Spicer, supra, at 18.
24. See Guttman, supra note 16, at 593–94 (“A . . . taxpayer—we’ll call him Z—has wage,
interest, and dividend income, and a state tax refund from last year. Z also deducts mortgage
interest, real property taxes, state income taxes, and some charitable contributions. Since most of
those income and deduction items are reported to the IRS by third parties, IRS computers probably
will compare the information reported by the third parties with that entered on Z’s tax return. If
there is no discernable discrepancy, which is usually the case, Z will not hear from the IRS.
Although Z might be unaware of this computer-based review, he has essentially been audited.”).
25. See AUDIT AND COLLECTION ACTIVITY STATISTICS FOR FISCAL 2000, supra note 16 (“we
have an aggressive document-matching program in place to cross-check wages, interest and
investment income to make sure people pay the right amount.”); Plumley, supra note 5, at 28
(showing that an information return matching program is a strong deterrent of filing noncompliance).
An IRS study of voluntary compliance found that an increase in document matching did not
increase reporting compliance. Id. at 36. However, as the study points out, compliance statistics
suggest that taxpayers assumed that comprehensive document matching was in place before it
actually was, so that an increase in actual matching would not influence reporting. Id.
26. See George Guttman, The Interplay of Enforcement and Voluntary Compliance, 83 TAX
NOTES 1683, 1683–84 (1999) (explaining that, in 1998, “the IRS collected more than a billion
dollars through letters sent as part of the information returns program.”).
27. “Voluntary compliance” is an appealing phrase, because, like the term “customer,” it
suggests that paying taxes is a choice, though of course it is not. One of my students once said
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types of income subject to information reporting (many of which also are
subject to withholding) than for those that are not.28 The overall
voluntary compliance rate with respect to wage and salary income, for
example, is generally estimated to be 95% or greater29 and for dividends
is approximately 94%.30 By contrast, voluntary compliance with respect
to income from self-employment income, which is not subject to
information reporting,31 is estimated at approximately 42% of taxes
due.32
something like, “voluntary compliance is ‘voluntary’ in the same way volunteer work is—it’s not
that you don’t have to perform, you just don’t get paid for it.”
28. In 1994, approximately 70% of net personal income tax revenues was collected via
withholding. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 153 (1996).
29. See Phil Brand, IRS’s Worker Classification Program—An Inside Look at New Ways to
Resolve the Problems, 85 J. TAX’N 17, 19 (1996) (unpublished IRS data indicates that, for
employees, the percentage of total taxes timely paid exceeds 98%, but for the self-employed, is
approximately 78%); IRS RESEARCH DIV., COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR SELECTED TYPES OF
PERSONAL INCOME 1987 (1988), reprinted in SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 28, at 150
[hereinafter 1987 COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES] (99.5% reporting rate for wages and salaries, 42.1% for
partnerships and S corporations, and 41.4% for self-employment income).
30. Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 71 n.130
(1996) (citing IRS, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH, GROSS TAX GAP ESTIMATES AND
PROJECTIONS FOR 1973–1992 (Publication 7285) Table I-2 (1988)). Wages, salaries, interest,
dividends, and pensions are all subject to information reporting. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note
28, at 153.
31. “Document matching is not useful for verifying business income, gain or loss on asset sales,
or most itemized deductions. We estimate that the total personal income that cannot be verified by
document matching was about $1.2 trillion in [fiscal year] 1998, or 19.7% of total reported personal
income.” Statement of Charles O. Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Before the
Annual RRA ’98 Joint Hearing on IRS Progress Convened by the Joint Committee on Taxation (May
14, 2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 94-19.
32. See 1987 COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 29. The level of tax compliance with
respect to illegal income is estimated to be only 5 or 10%. See, e.g., Leo P. Martinez, Federal Tax
Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revisited, 10 VA. TAX REV. 535, 555 n.76 (1991) (compliance rate
of heroin sellers estimated to be 9%) (citations omitted); S. Rep. No. 97-494, at 251 (1982)
(estimating 5% reporting rate for illegal income).
Tax on income from illegal business may be hardest to collect because of the secretive
nature of the activity. The magnitude of this problem is unclear because “tax gap” figures,
extrapolated from TCMP audit results, do not include most illegal-source income. See George
Guttman, Measuring the Effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service, 89 TAX NOTES 1102, 1104
(2000). However, it appears to be substantial. See Martinez, supra, at 555 n.76 (citing ABT
ASSOCIATES, UNREPORTED TAXABLE INCOME FROM SELECTED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, 61, 108, 147
(1984) (estimating unreported taxable income in 1982 was $22.15 billion for drugs, $2.39 billion for
gambling, and $1.58 billion for prostitution)). Taxpayers engaged in illegal activity have a strong
incentive not to report the income from that activity because reporting it may reveal the underlying
crime. See id. at 580 (“For some, evasion is a conscious act to avoid detection of illegal activities
such as drug sales or money laundering . . . .”).
Tax underpayments involving illegal income may be more susceptible to criminal
prosecution than other cases because they involve activity that is itself illegal. That is, it may be
easier to prove that underreporting was intentional rather than accidental with respect to illegalsource income. However, prosecution for tax evasion may be pointless in most cases in which there
is underlying criminal activity for which the taxpayer can be prosecuted. That is, absent an
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Nonetheless, the constraining techniques of information reporting
and withholding and adversarial techniques focused on enforcement
probably do not explain all tax compliance. That is, there may be a role
for softer, more “cooperative” strategies.33 There are a variety of
possible cooperative strategies but, given the focus of IRS reform, a
particularly important question is whether IRS “friendliness”—in the
form of increased service, an emphasis on procedural fairness, or a softer
tone in communications with taxpayers—can increase voluntary
compliance. This is an important question because the revenue from
voluntary compliance constitutes approximately 98% of total revenue.34
Following this Introduction, the article contains two principal parts.
First, Part II focuses on IRS reform. Section A of that part briefly
discusses the events that led to IRS reform. Section B considers the
effect that IRS reform has had on enforcement to date.
Part III of the article examines the critical question of the effect of a
kinder, gentler IRS on voluntary compliance. Section A of that Part
considers the available evidence of the impact of taxpayer service on tax
collection. Section B discusses the relevance of perceptions of
procedural fairness. Section C analyzes the role of the tone of
communications from a tax collection agency. The article concludes that
there is little evidence that greater “customer service” by the IRS or a
softer tone that is not sensitive to context will increase compliance, but
that it is possible that increased perceived procedural fairness may have a
positive effect on compliance.

extraordinary situation in which the underlying criminal activity cannot be proven, but tax evasion
can, adding a charge of tax evasion would have little marginal deterrent effect. Moreover, it would
have little deterrent effect on other criminals. It would also probably have much less deterrent effect
on taxpayers with legal-source income than would criminal prosecution of other taxpayers with
legal-source income. See Stefan F. Tucker, ABA Tax Section Suggests Changes to Criminal
Investigation Division (Dec. 23, 1998), LEXIS, 1999 TNT 10-32. The IRS study of voluntary
compliance found that criminal tax convictions has a significant and positive effect on reporting
compliance. See Plumley, supra note 5, at 36. However, that study did not distinguish between
criminal tax prosecutions of those with legal-source and those with illegal-source income.
Given the likely lack of deterrent effect of enforcement directed at illegal-source income, it
is likely very inefficient for the IRS to pursue the taxes on criminal-source income, except perhaps in
isolated cases where the taxpayer has substantial assets. The IRS will get more value from its
limited enforcement resources by pursuing other tax evaders.
33. See generally Lederman, supra note 14 (arguing that fostering compliance norms can
increase compliance and that enforcement can help sustain those norms).
34. See infra text accompanying note 76 (enforcement revenue constitutes approximately 2% of
total revenue collected after refunds).
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II. The Connection Between IRS Reform and Tax Compliance
A. Why Reform the IRS?
There are a number of possible (and overlapping) concerns about any
tax collection agency: (1) its efficiency, which may implicate things such
as its use of technology; (2) the skills of its workforce, which may reflect
issues such as the adequacy of training; (3) possible abuses of power by
employees; and (4) the image of the agency, which is sometimes said to
affect voluntary compliance. The federal government, including Charles
Rossotti, who was Commissioner of the IRS from November 1997 to
November 2002,35 has focused on all of these issues.36 However, IRS
reform specifically stems from a variety of problems that Congress and
taxpayers experienced beginning in the early 1990s.
First, the IRS poorly implemented a computer upgrading project at a
cost of $4 billion dollars, after Congress appropriated funds for that
purpose.37 Second, the General Accounting Office issued numerous
reports criticizing a variety of aspects of IRS performance.38 Third,
taxpayers complained about difficulties in reaching the IRS by telephone,
rude treatment by IRS personnel, and the intrusiveness of the Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), the in-depth audit the IRS
used as a compliance tool.39 In 1995, Congress established a commission
to consider restructuring the IRS.40 In 1997, the commission made
several recommendations, including restructuring Congressional
oversight of the IRS, providing the IRS with a Board of Directors,
updating the IRS’s technology, requiring the IRS to develop a strategic
plan for increasing electronic filing of tax returns, increasing taxpayers’
ability to recover damages in appropriate cases, and simplification of the
tax law.41

35. The current Commissioner is Mark W. Everson. See http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=
98192,00.html (last visited May 3, 2003).
36. See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1 (“Goals of the IRS Reform Act
included increasing public confidence in the IRS and making the IRS an efficient, responsive, and
respected agency that acts appropriately in carrying out its functions.”); Patti Mohr, Compliance
Problems Top Priority, Rossotti Says, 91 TAX NOTES 206, 206 (2001) (“Rossotti named customer
service, fairness, and compliance as the top priorities of IRS restructuring at the most basic level.”).
37. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORTS ON STATUS OF IRS RESTRUCTURING
AND REFORM (Mar. 22, 2001), LEXIS, 2001 TNT 60-42 [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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As a result of the commission’s report, in 1997, Representative Rob
Portman and Senator Bob Kerrey introduced bills that reflected the
commission’s recommendations.42 However, before work on the Senate
bill was completed,43 the Senate Finance Committee collected “horror
stories”44 and conducted hearings that were broadcast on television45—
which “effectively altered the tenor of the legislation.”46
The
government subsequently investigated many of the horror stories and
found them to be unfounded or exaggerated47—a standard risk in relying
on anecdotes as the basis for legislation48—but the investigation was not
completed until after Congress had reacted to the show.49
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Ryan J. Donmoyer, GOP Opens IRS Horror Story Web Site, 77 TAX NOTES 667, 667
(1997). Halloween was chosen as the date to unveil the website, apparently because of its symbolic
value. See id. (“‘This Halloween, the Republican Congress is unmasking the IRS for what it really
is:.a bureaucratic monster stalking the American taxpayer,’ [Rep. John A.] Boehner said.”).
45. See Ryan J. Donmoyer, Three Days of Hearings Paint Picture of Troubled IRS, 76 TAX
NOTES 1655, 1655 (1997) (discussing broadcasts of taxpayers telling their horror stories on live
television). Senator William Roth, who chaired the hearings, also co-authored a book that “vividly
recreate[s] the stories of the victims of the Internal Revenue Service using exclusive interviews with
those who have been unjustly audited, foreclosed, prosecuted, and worse.” Dust jacket of WILLIAM
V. ROTH, JR. & WILLIAM H. NIXON, THE POWER TO DESTROY (1999).
46. CRS REPORT, supra note 37. This was not the first set of IRS hearings that led to more
taxpayer “rights”:
In 1987 and 1988, then-Senator David Pryor, who was head of the Finance Committee’s
Oversight subcommittee, held hearings on taxpayer problems in dealing with the IRS.
(Those hearings were unusual because Finance subcommittees do not have the staff or
budget to do investigations.) The hearings led to the adoption of the first Taxpayer Bill
of Rights.
George Guttman, Evaluating the IRS: The Senate Finance Hearings in Retrospect, 77 TAX NOTES
13, 13 (1997). Those hearings focused on taxpayer horror stories, as well. See MaryGael
Timberlake, Bentsen Voices Opposition to Gas Tax Increase; Taxpayers Kiss Old Law Goodbye on
April 15, 35 TAX NOTES 213, 214 (1987) (“[S]hortly before recessing, the Finance Subcommittee on
IRS Oversight held the first of two hearings on a bill by Subcommittee Chairman David Pryor, DArk., to establish a taxpayers’ bill of rights. The hearing largely focused on taxpayers’ horror stories
at the hands of the IRS.”).
47. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF IRS TAXPAYER
ABUSE (May 24, 1999), LEXIS, 2000 TNT 80-13; see also Joe Spellman, Conference Panel
Ponders Finance Hearing Horror Stories, 83 TAX NOTES 1854, 1854–55 (1999) (discussing the
hearings generally and mentioning the situation of John Colaprete in particular).
48. See David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797 (1998)
(describing the perils of relying on anecdotes instead of data).
49. In 1997, Congress held a series of hearings where the American people saw the
Internal Revenue Service almost literally on trial. They saw a parade of witness [sic]
come before Congress to testify about the naked abuse of power over at the Internal
Revenue Service.
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The principal charge that Congress gave the IRS was to reorganize
and become more “customer”-friendly.50 The restructuring ranged from
the symbolic, such as a changed mission statement51 that does not
mention the collection of taxes,52 to an expensive overhaul of the entire
organizational structure. The overhaul involved a change from a
geography-focused organization to one based on taxpayer segments.53

We saw current and former IRS agents who had to testify in secret because they
feared for their lives. We saw ordinary citizens, taxpayers, who talked about how an
audit turned their entire lives upside down, with some of them suffering great financial
loss that will never be recovered. We saw a government agency totally out of control,
lacking accountability, an agency where one is guilty until proven innocent.
We saw and heard all this and we acted to put a stop to it. We enacted sweeping
reforms of the IRS to make it more efficient and taxpayer friendly, and we provided
critical new protections for the American taxpayer to make the IRS more accountable. In
a sense, the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act put the IRS on
probation.
JOINT REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC PLANS AND BUDGET OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, AS
REQUIRED BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, JCS4-99, at 77 (May 25, 1999) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLANS AND BUDGET] (opening statement of Rep.
Forbes), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1999_joint_
committee_on_taxation&docid=f:57610.wais (last visited August 17, 2003).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 99–102.
51. The new mission statement is: “Provide America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping
them understand and meet their tax responsibilities by applying the tax law with integrity and
fairness to all.” I.R.M. § 1.1.1.1(1). The old one read: “The purpose of the Internal Revenue Service
is to collect the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost; serve the public by continually
improving the quality of our products and services; and perform in a manner warranting the highest
degree of public confidence in our integrity and fairness.” Policy Statement P-1-1, Status (approved
Dec. 18, 1993) (from 1998 Internal Revenue Manual). That mission statement dated from the 1960s.
Rossotti, supra note 8, at 1192.
52. “What’s missing [from the new IRS mission statement]? In the new mission statement the
words ‘collect taxes’ do not appear.” Tax Analysts’ Executive Director Addresses IRS’s Split
Personality, 95 TAX NOTES 1266, 1267 (2002). Even the goals of the restructuring do not explicitly
focus on the collection of taxes:
To assist in achieving its new mission, the IRS has developed three strategic goals. The
first goal is to provide top quality service to each taxpayer. The second goal is to provide
top quality service to all taxpayers. The third goal is to increase productivity within the
IRS by providing IRS employees with a quality work environment. The IRS describes the
process of change necessary to meet its strategic goals and fulfill its mission statement as
“modernization.”
JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
53. RRA ’98, supra note 9, § 1001(a). The four principal divisions of the new structure are
Wage and Investment Income (W&I), Small Business and Self-Employed (SB/SE), Large and MidSized Businesses (LMSB), and Tax-Exempt and Government Entities (TE/GE). See LEANDRA
LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 6 (2d ed.
2002) (noting the four operating divisions); cf. I.R.M. § 5.17.1.4.1(2). There are other divisions, as
well, such as the Appeals Division and the Criminal Investigation Division. See LEDERMAN &
MAZZA, supra, at 6 (noting the functional units of the IRS).
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RRA ’98 also contained an array of pro-taxpayer procedural
provisions, most of which were collected under the label “Taxpayer Bill
of Rights 3,” the name for Title III of the Act, which contained over 70
provisions.54
Some provisions restrict the IRS’s approaches to
collection, such as the one requiring that all liens, levies, and seizures
have supervisor approval;55 the section prohibiting IRS seizure of a
taxpayer’s home without judicial approval;56 and the “collection due
process” procedures.57 A provision widely linked58 to a decline in
enforcement activity,59 referred to as the “ten deadly sins,” calls for
sanctioning with termination of employment a wide variety of IRS
employee behavior.60
54. See RRA ’98, supra note 9, §§ 3000 et seq. (Taxpayer Protection and Rights).
55. See id. § 3421 (effective on July 28, 1998, except that, for collection actions under the
automated collection system, effective for collection actions initiated after December 31, 2000).
56. I.R.C. § 6334(e)(1); RRA ’98, supra note 9, § 3445(a), (b).
57. I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330; RRA ’98 supra note 9, § 3401; see also Leslie Book, The New
Collection Due Process Taxpayer Rights, 86 TAX NOTES 1127, 1127 (2000) (providing context for
the collection due process changes).
58. See Ann Murphy & David Higer, The 10 Deadly Sins: A Law With Unintended
Consequences, 96 TAX NOTES 871, 873 (2002) (arguing that a fear of prosecution among IRS
employees hampers enforcement); Amy Hamilton, Newspapers Link “10 Deadly Sins” to IRS
Enforcement Figures Drop, 83 TAX NOTES 1119, 1119 (1999) (“the key issue appears to be fear
among the IRS employees that they will break a law intended to protect taxpayers from overzealous
collectors”).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 69–73.
60. RRA ’98, supra note 9 § 1203(b). The ten deadly sins are:
(1) willful failure to obtain the required approval signatures on documents authorizing the
seizure of a taxpayer's home, personal belongings, or business assets; (2) providing a
false statement under oath with respect to a material matter involving a taxpayer or
taxpayer representative; (3) with respect to a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, or other
employee of the Internal Revenue Service, the violation of—(A) any right under the
Constitution of the United States; or (B) any civil right established under—(i) title VI or
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (ii) title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972;
(iii) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; (iv) the Age Discrimination Act
of 1975; (v) section 501 or 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; or (vi) title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; (4) falsifying or destroying documents to
conceal mistakes made by any employee with respect to a matter involving a taxpayer or
taxpayer representative; (5) assault or battery on a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, or
other employee of the Internal Revenue Service, but only if there is a criminal conviction,
or a final judgment by a court in a civil case, with respect to the assault or battery; (6)
violations of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Department of Treasury regulations, or
policies of the Internal Revenue Service (including the Internal Revenue Manual) for the
purpose of retaliating against, or harassing, a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, or other
employee of the Internal Revenue Service; (7) willful misuse of the provisions of section
6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for the purpose of concealing information
from a congressional inquiry; (8) willful failure to file any return of tax required under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 on or before the date prescribed therefore (including
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Other provisions assist taxpayers in contesting asserted liabilities.
These include a section providing for the possibility of a shift of the
burden of proof to the IRS in litigated tax cases,61 a more widely
applicable set of rules for “innocent spouse” relief from joint and several
liability,62 an authorization of $6 million in matching funds for lowincome taxpayer clinics (since increased to $7 million),63 and cessation
of both interest and certain time-sensitive penalties in cases in which the
IRS does not send notice of the proposed liability within 12 or 18
months,64 despite the periods of three years and longer contained in the
statute of limitations on assessment.65
Following RRA ’98, the IRS shifted substantial resources from
enforcement to taxpayer service, partly by not rehiring in enforcement
for attrition, and partly by detailing enforcement personnel to taxpayer
service.66 In fiscal year 2000, the detailing of personnel to customer
service reduced examination programs by 605 staff years.67 In fiscal
any extensions), unless such failure is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect;
(9) willful understatement of Federal tax liability, unless such understatement is due to
reasonable cause and not to willful neglect; and (10) threatening to audit a taxpayer for
the purpose of extracting personal gain or benefit.
Id. The IRS has “requested that the unauthorized inspection of returns or return information be
added to the list of violations.” JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
61. I.R.C. § 7491; RRA ’98, supra note 9, at § 3001(a).
62. I.R.C. § 6015; RRA ’98, supra note 9, § 3201.
63. I.R.C. § 7526; RRA ’98, supra note 9, § 3103.
64. I.R.C. § 6404(g).
65. Id.. § 6501.
66. “In response to the-[] demands [of RRA ’98], and with a declining pool of staff resources,
IRS reallocated staff from compliance (other than returns processing) and collection programs to
provide additional support to taxpayer assistance services.” JAMES R. WHITE, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IMPACT OF COMPLIANCE
AND COLLECTION PROGRAM DECLINES ON TAXPAYERS, GAO-02-674 (May 22, 2002), LEXIS, 2002
TNT 126–60 [hereinafter TAX ADMINISTRATION REPORT]; see also Patti Mohr, “Compliance
Problems Top Priority,” Rossotti Says, 91 TAX NOTES 206, 206 (2001) (“The agency’s ability to
enforce compliance fell this past year [2000] because of a long-term decline in staffing and a shift
toward staffing customer service positions.”). The detailing generally occurred during tax filing
season (January through mid-April). DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MANAGEMENT ADVISORY
REPORT: THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE’S RESPONSE TO THE FALLING LEVEL OF INCOME TAX
EXAMINATIONS AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE, Ref. No. 2002-30-092,
at 4 (June 2002) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/2002reports/200230092fr.pdf (last visited
August 21, 2003) [hereinafter 2002 MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT].
67. 2002 MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 66, at 4. A staff year consists of 2000
hours. Id. at 9 n.9.
In 2000, the time detailed to taxpayer service amounted to approximately 14% of collection
time. TAX ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 66. That figure dropped to 5% in 2001. Id. The
total number of staff years detailed from collection and examination to customer service is reflected
in the following table:
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year 2001, the number of professional staff in audit and field collection
was about 21% lower than a pre-1987 buildup in that staff.68
B. The Impact of IRS Reform on Enforced Compliance
Not surprisingly, the post-RRA ’98 reallocation of resources resulted
in (or at least coincided with) a significant decline in enforcement
activity.69 It has been well publicized that the most aggressive tax
collection tools, levies and seizures (along with notices of federal tax
lien70), dropped substantially following the mid-1998 enactment of RRA
’98, and only began to increase slightly in 2001. The following table
provides those numbers:71

Fiscal
Year

Aggregate Staff Years Detailed to Customer
Service from Collection and Examination

1996

165

1997

265

1998

491

1999

755

2000

974

2001

271

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT: ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN
COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2001, Ref. No. 2002-30-184, at 14 (Sept. 2002)
available at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/2002reports/200230184fr.pdf (last visited August 21, 2003)
[hereinafter MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT: COMPLIANCE].
68. TAX ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 66. The IRS reversed the downward trend,
hiring 646 new Revenue Agents and 126 new Tax Compliance Officers in June and July of 2001.
2002 MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 66, at 4. They will require several years of
training and experience to be fully productive. Id.
69. The average time spent per tax return examined dramatically increased from 30 to 44 hours.
Id. at 9. That may be due to the restructuring or lower morale, among other factors. Id.
70. Notices of Federal Tax Lien do not directly produce revenue but, because they protect the
IRS’s interest with respect to other creditors of the taxpayer, they may have a delayed effect on
enforcement revenue.
71. The chart is IRS data drawn from the following reports: INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:
DELINQUENT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2001; DELINQUENT COLLECTION
ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEARS 1999 AND 2000; DELINQUENT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEARS
1998 AND 1999; AND DELINQUENT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEARS 1997 AND 1998,
available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=97168,00.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
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Table 1
Notices of Federal Tax Lien, Levies, and Seizures, 1997-2001
Fiscal
Year72

Notice
of
Federal Tax
Lien
(Rounded)

Levies
(Rounded)

Seizures

1997

544,000

3,659,000

10,090

1998

383,000

2,503,000

2,259

1999

168,000

504,000

161

2000

288,000

220,000

174

2001

428,000

447,000

255

Audit rates continued a decline that had begun before RRA ’98
became law.73
These figures are dramatic but not surprising in light of the complex
reorganization and substantial retraining of personnel required by RRA

72. The government’s fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30. See Martin A.
Sullivan, Economic Analysis—Corporate Tax Revenues: Up, Down, and All Around, 95 TAX NOTES
25, 25 (2002) (giving October 1 as the starting date for the government’s fiscal year).
73. “The IRS continues to audit the 1,100 largest corporations every year but the audit rate for
all other corporations declined from 3 percent in 1992 to 1.1 percent in fiscal year 2001.” JOINT
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at ¶ 120. The table below shows the audit rates for individuals
from 1995 through 2001.
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Audit Rate
1.67%
1.67%
1.28%
.99%
.90%
.49%
.58%

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/pub3970_2-2002.pdf at 43 (Dec. 2001) (last
visited August 21, 2003) [hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PROGRESS REPORT].
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’98. They are also not particularly informative.74 More informative than
a short-term decline in enforcement activity is its effect on revenue
collected; liens, levies, and seizures are only the tools, not the results.
After RRA ’98 was enacted, enforcement revenue declined somewhat, as
the chart below illustrates.75 Yet total revenue increased (in absolute
terms).76 Thus, enforcement revenue steadily declined as a percentage of
total revenue until 2001.
Table 2
Enforcement Revenue Compared to Total Revenue, 1997-2001
Fiscal
Year

Total Federal
Tax Revenue
Collected
Before
Refunds
(Billions)

Total
Revenue
Collected
After
Refunds
(Billions)

Enforcement
Revenue
(Billions)

Enforcement
Revenue as
Percent of Total
Revenue After
Refunds

1997

1,623.27

1,505.0

37.2

2.47%

1998

1,769.41

1,641.3

35.2

2.14%

1999

1,904.15

1,746.1

32.9

1.88%

2000

2,096.92

1,900.3

33.8

1.78%

2001

2,128.83

1,902.1

33.8

1.78%

Why did enforcement revenue not decline as much as the decline in
enforcement activity might suggest? Enforcement revenue comes from a
74. The Taxpayer Protection and IRS Accountability Act of 2003, H.R. 1528, which passed the
House in June of 2003, includes a provision to do a study of “of the practices of the Internal Revenue
Service concerning liens and levies,” including “the declining use of liens and levies by the Internal
Revenue Service.” Id. § 205.
75. Most of the data in this table appears in the Appendix to the JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 1. Total Federal Tax Revenue collected is rounded to one decimal point in the Appendix
to the JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT. Those figures appear in more detail at INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE GROSS COLLECTIONS BY TYPE OF TAX, FISCAL YEARS 1973-2002, at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02db07c0.xls (last visited May 4, 2003) [hereinafter IRS STATISTICS
OF INCOME]. Percentages are calculated by the author.
76. The absolute amount of gross tax collections of individual income taxes also increased over
that period. The figures are as follows: for 1997, $825.02 billion; for 1998, $928.07 billion; for
1999, $1002.19 billion; for 2000, $1137.08 billion, and for 2001, $1178.21 billion. See IRS
STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 75.
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multitude of sources, but the bulk of enforcement revenue comes from
“delinquent accounts.”77 These are taxpayer accounts with the IRS in
cases in which the IRS has assessed the tax—so that, in most cases,
liability is not in dispute—but has not collected it. Levy and seizure
revenue constitute a relatively small portion of delinquent account
revenue.78 Much delinquent account revenue is collected following IRS
telephone calls or letters and through installment agreements.79 As a
77. The following chart shows the portion of enforcement revenue from delinquent accounts for
the five-year period between 1997 and 2001:
Fiscal
Year

Delinquent Account Revenue as Percent of
Enforcement Revenue

1997

80.40%

1998

84.97%

1999

88.66%

2000

88.58%

2001

95.24%

For sources of data in this chart, see IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 75, and JOINT
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1 (percentages calculated by the author).
78. Guttman, supra note 26, at 1683–84.
79.George Guttman states that about 20% of enforcement revenue is collected under installment
agreements, see id. at 1683, but the chart below suggests that it is closer to 25%. In contrast, Offers
in Compromise provide a tiny fraction of the revenue.
Fiscal
Year

Number of
Installment
Agreements Entered
(Rounded)

Aggregate Dollars
Received from
Installment
Agreements

Aggregate Dollars
Received from Offers
in Compromise

1997

2,816,000

10.84 billion

295.0 million

1998

2,828,000

10.752 billion

290.1 million

1999

2,431,000

8.415 billion

311.6 million

2000

2,243,000

8.321 billion

316.2 million

2001

2,147,000

8.638 billion

340.8 million

See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 73, at 44; JAMES R. WHITE,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS SHOULD EVALUATE THE CHANGES TO ITS OFFER IN
COMPROMISE PROGRAM (Mar. 2002), Appendix I tbl. 5, LEXIS, 2002 TNT 60-22.
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result, absolute revenue from delinquent accounts did not really
decline,80 as Table 3 shows.81
Table 3
Delinquent Account Revenue, 1997–2001
Fiscal
Year

Revenue from Delinquent Accounts
(Billions of Dollars)

1997

29.91

1998

29.91

1999

29.17

2000

29.94

2001

32.19

Overall, the data indicates that RRA ’98 decreased enforcement, at
least temporarily, which is not surprising. Congress did not manifest
particular concern with compliance when it focused on reforming the
IRS to be more service-oriented and respectful of taxpayer rights, and,
given limited resources, an increase in service is likely to result in a
decrease in enforcement. Yet, despite the press reports about the
dramatic drop in liens, levies, and seizures, RRA ’98 has not been a
disaster for absolute enforcement revenue.
Of course, the revenue figures above do not reveal what percent of
available revenue the IRS actually is collecting and whether that percent

80. See TAX ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 66 (“In general, the amount of unpaid taxes
identified by these compliance programs did not decline as much as the number of cases closed. In
two of the six compliance programs, the amount of unpaid taxes identified increased. The data
available to us do not make clear the extent to which this increase may represent a change in the type
of cases worked, increased levels of noncompliance by taxpayers, or other factors, including
inflation.”).
81. The data in this chart are taken from INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DELINQUENT
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2001 (MAR. 2002); DELINQUENT COLLECTION
ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEAR 1998 AND 1999 (May 2001); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DELINQUENT
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEARS 1997 AND 1998 (Sept. 2000); all available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=97168,00.html (last visited August 17, 2003).
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has declined.82 Immediately following RRA ’98, there was a dramatic
increase in the number of delinquent accounts that the IRS did not
pursue:
The IRS has . . . sent cases of delinquent taxpayers to an inactive
file with increasing regularity. In 1999, the IRS sent 668,018 cases to
the inactive file as compared to just 98 in 1998. Sending these cases
(a sizeable percentage of the three million cases from 1999) to the
inactive file had the practical effect of writing off $2.5 billion in taxes
owed to Treasury.83

More specifically, the data for 1998 through 2001 are as follows:

Fiscal
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001

Table 4
Action on Delinquent Accounts, 1998-200184
Portion of Delinquent Aggregate Dollar Amount
Accounts Moved to
of Delinquent Accounts
Inactive File
Moved to Inactive File
Nearly zero
Nearly zero
26.7%
$.71 billion
46.6%
$2.5 billion
N/A
$1.78 billion (projected
based on portion through
March 31)

In 1999, the IRS instituted a new priority system that generally
assigned priorities to more recent cases, those with higher delinquent
82. Cf. Alan H. Plumley, The Impact of the IRS on Voluntary Tax Compliance: Preliminary
Empirical Results (Nov. 14, 2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 224-22 (“Our latest projection of the gross
tax gap (the amount of tax imposed by law that is not paid voluntarily and timely) was on the order
of $275 billion for all income and employment taxes in 1998. This was over 15% of the tax due. Of
that amount, we estimate that only $50 billion will eventually be collected through enforcement and
other late payments.”).
83. Murphy & Higer, supra note 58, at 872 (footnotes omitted). The number of taxpayers with
unpaid tax liabilities in the “queue,” an automated file holding cases that the IRS does not have the
resources to work, see MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT: COMPLIANCE, supra note 67, at 10, was
317,865 in fiscal year 1996; 425,780 in fiscal year 1997; 407,210 in fiscal year 1998; 445,877 in
fiscal year 1999; 537,781 in fiscal year 2000; and 542,406 in fiscal year 2001. Id. at 16, Figure 9.
The value of unpaid accounts in the queue increased from $2.96 billion in September 1996 to $7.85
billion in September 1999. Memorandum from Pamela J. Gardiner, Deputy Inspector General for
Audit to Commissioner Rossotti (May 12, 2000), at 10. In 2001, the IRS used a special closing code
to remove 1,720,683 unpaid accounts from the queue. MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT:
COMPLIANCE, supra note 67, at 16, fig. 10.
84. The source of this data is David Cay Johnston, A Smaller I.R.S. Gives Up on Billions in
Back Taxes, The N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2001, at A1, who drew them from IRS documents he
received from an IRS employee.
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amounts, to taxpayers who contacted the IRS about their delinquencies,
and to employment tax over income tax.85 In addition, the new system
provides for periodic review of the cases and setting aside of those of a
certain age that have been passed over for more recent cases.86 Thus,
former Commissioner Rossotti stated that the IRS has shifted its focus to
the “most productive cases.”87
The new system achieved its goals in that
the median amount owed by the taxpayers for whom collection action
was deferred was about $4,500, compared with $5,500 for other
delinquent taxpayers in the collection population. Also, the taxpayers
for whom collection action was deferred tended to have been
delinquent for a longer period of time—about an estimated 5.6 years
versus an estimated 3.9 years.88

While positive, this achievement should be considered in the larger
context of the possible revenue the IRS did not have the resources to
pursue:
[B]y the end of fiscal year 2001, after the deferral policy had been in
place for about two and one-half years, IRS had deferred collection
action on the tax debts of an estimated 1.3 million taxpayers. We also
estimate that these 1.3 million taxpayers owed about $16.1 billion in
unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties that originated from assessments
by all six compliance programs. By fiscal year 2001, IRS was
deferring collection action on tax debts at a rate equal to one of three
new delinquencies assigned to the collection programs.89

Thus, although enforcement revenue did not decrease dramatically
between 1998 and 2001, it appears that the portion of identified
85. TAX ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 66, at ¶ 35.
86. Id. Those cases are labeled “not collectible” but the taxpayers involved continue to get
notices and to have any refunds seized to offset their balances due. Id. The IRS is entitled to reopen
those cases, so long as the statute of limitations on collections has not expired, but in practice will
not do so unless “(1) . . . the taxpayer becomes delinquent again or if IRS receives information
indicating that the taxpayer had additional assets that could help pay off the delinquency and (2) . . .
IRS finds the resources to work” those cases. Id.
87. Letter from Charles O. Rossotti to James R. White, included as Appendix II of TAX
ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 66, at ¶ 91 (“Your report indicates that although there has
been a 28% decline in direct staff time there was only a 7% drop in dollars collected. This is a result
of our continuing efforts to provide focus to the most productive cases in our inventory. We are
hopeful that this focus as well as our reengineering efforts will help improve productivity and
reverse some of the declines.”).
88. Id. at ¶ 38 (footnotes omitted).
89. Id. at ¶ 37 (footnotes omitted).
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delinquencies that the IRS pursued and collected decreased and the
magnitude of uncollected delinquencies grew substantially. This paints a
bleaker picture of the short-term effect of RRA ’98 on enforcement than
does collections alone.90 Of course, the key question for the federal fisc
is the likely effect of a change in enforcement activity or results on
voluntary compliance. The next Part considers the possible impact on
voluntary compliance of the IRS’s shift in focus to a more “customer”oriented organization following RRA ’98.
III. THE ROLE OF A KINDER, GENTLER IRS
What role does a reformed, “friendlier” IRS play in a tax compliance
strategy? Do taxpayers respond differently to a service-oriented IRS or
to a softer tone in IRS enforcement?
Some IRS officials91 and others92 apparently hold the view that a
friendlier IRS is better for compliance.
Theoretically, greater
responsiveness to taxpayers may support greater tax collection, just not
through enforcement.93 Kent Smith has argued that:
90. “The IRS attributes its inability fully to pursue enforcement cases to the modernization
effort, a decrease in staff, reassignment of collection employees to support customer service
activities, and additional staff time needed to implement certain taxpayer protections that were
included in the IRS Reform Act.” JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5–6.
91. See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 4, at 36–37 (“[T]here is disagreement within the IRS on how
to ensure voluntary compliance. Should the IRS threaten taxpayers with enforcement action, or
provide better customer service? The pendulum swings back and forth every few years between
compliance and customer service, but there is no consensus on how best to proceed.”); Lee A.
Sheppard, ABA Ponders Where We Go from Here (May 20, 1987), LEXIS, 87 TNT 98-4 (“We’re
asking ourselves what our role is, and trying to treat taxpayers and practitioners as customers,’ said
[then-Commissioner Lawrence] Gibbs, recognizing the need for enhanced taxpayer assistance.
Public relations and soul searching aside, enforcement of the laws is what keeps people honest.
“People are, in the final analysis, going to pay their taxes because they think they’ll get caught, and
have to pay a penalty,” Gibbs observed. So much newly budgeted money and effort will go into
enhanced enforcement and examination.”).
92. See Jack Teuber, IRS Horror Stories Prompt Hearing on Proposed Taxpayers “Bill of
Rights,” 35 TAX NOTES 219, 220 (1987) (quoting Senator David Pryor) (“Like a bully, the IRS relies
on intimidation and arm twisting to strike fear into the hearts of those it bullies . . . . And they do
this in the name of compliance. It is my guess that compliance could be improved not by continuing
to browbeat taxpayers, but by reestablishing respect for the IRS in the manner in which it performs a
difficult and unpopular task.”).
93. Professor Joshua Rosenberg has made this argument, comparing a service-oriented IRS
focus to a customer-focused retail store:
I began to consider what the IRS might learn from other customer-friendly and successful
enterprises. I noted that when I go to Nordstrom’s Department stores, an enterprise
nationally known for being customer-friendly, an associate is always available and
attentive, guiding me, helping me figure out what to select, and ringing up the sale. The
customer is encouraged, in a very helpful and friendly way, to buy what the store has to
sell . . . .
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[r]esponsive service and procedural fairness as positive treatments by
tax authorities can have both direct and indirect effects on taxpayers’
compliance behavior.
Positive actions by authorities toward
taxpayers may be reciprocated by compliant actions on a simple titfor-tat basis, a direct effect on taxpayers’ actions that is not mediated
by normative or legitimating processes. However, reciprocity also
appears to be a basic, normative obligation in many social situations,
and positive treatments by authorities may also engender in taxpayers
a more general normative commitment to compliance, particularly if
the taxpayers believe that the authorities normally and routinely act
positively toward taxpayers.94

As this excerpt suggests, IRS service to taxpayers and procedural
fairness are two different but connected concepts.95 The IRS’s “service”
role is in helping taxpayers comply with the tax laws.96 Procedural
fairness refers to issues such as due process and equality of treatment.97
Each may impact compliance by affecting the taxpayer’s image of the

On the other hand, at some less well-run stores, the customer may be left alone to
wait endlessly for assistance. . . .
In many ways, our tax collection system has resembled a poorly run retail
operation: “customers” typically feel like they have been left on their own to ferret out
where to go and what to do. Their available choices often appear unclear and confusing;
while attempting to figure out how to do the “right” thing (pay what they owe), they are
met with numerous temptations to do wrong (cheat or exaggerate, at least a little). . . .
“Sales” (tax revenues, to be exact) are way down, but the customers remain angry at the
IRS rather than pleased with their ability to pay less than they should. . . .
Joshua D. Rosenberg, A Helpful and Efficient IRS: Some Simple and Powerful Suggestions, 88 KY.
L.J. 33, 35–37 (1999–2000) (emphasis in original).
94. Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES 223, 227, supra note 23.
95. See id. at 224–25 (stating that both concepts are positive actions intended to increase
taxpayer compliance).
96. See id. (“[T]he government has an ethical responsibility to assist taxpayers in meeting their
tax reporting obligations . . . ”). The scale for “responsive service” consisted of five questions
asking those responding to the survey to rate the IRS in comparison to financial institutions and
federal government agencies. Id. at 230–31.
97. See id. at 224 (stating that procedural fairness includes the opportunities given taxpayers to
tell their side of the story, how fair the IRS is to taxpayers, the correctability of decisions, and how
equitably and consistently individuals are treated); see also id. at 231 (listing survey items related to
procedural fairness). The “procedural fairness” scale was based on four questions focusing on such
things as IRS procedures and practices and the honesty of IRS employees. Id. Smith argues that
responsive service by a tax collector is probably a precondition to procedural fairness. Id. at 228.
His examination of IRS survey data found that likely to be the case. See id. at 242.
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IRS. For the same reasons, the tone of IRS communications also may
affect taxpayers’ perceptions of the IRS.98
It seems intuitively plausible that such cooperative techniques as
responsive service and procedural fairness might affect tax compliance,
but is the argument borne out by empirical evidence? Section A of this
Part discusses the available evidence on tax collector service to
taxpayers. Section B discusses procedural fairness. Section C considers
the tone of letters sent to taxpayers.
A. Service
One of the changes brought about by the process of IRS reform was
the now-standard reference to taxpayers as “customers” of the IRS.99
This nomenclature actually began in the 1980s with then-Commissioner
Larry Gibbs100 as part of a focus on private sector management
concepts.101 Accordingly, the reference to “customers” seems to derive
98. Cf. George Guttman, Customer Service: the IRS’s Last Name, 97 TAX NOTES 454, 454
(2002) (“For whom are the IRS letters intended—taxpayers or tax practitioners? If the former, the
letters and attachments are probably beyond most taxpayers’ comprehension. Although I have some
knowledge of tax, I had to read the nine pages [of a particular letter] twice to understand what it
meant.”).
99. The word choice seems odd. A “customer” is “one that purchases a commodity or service.”
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary. What does the
public purchase from the IRS? See James A. Guthrie, Taxpayers Aren’t “Customers,” Attorney
Says, 82 TAX NOTES 200, 200 (1998) (arguing that the IRS’s practice of referring to taxpayers as
“customers” is offensive to both taxpayers and tax professionals); House Passes IRS Reform Bill
(Nov. 5, 1997), LEXIS, 97 TNT 222–39 (“It is . . . preposterous to refer to victims as customers.
Taxpayers are no more customers of an organization providing a service than the man in the moon.
This type of wording is nothing more than the newspeak of which Orwell wrote.”) (remarks of Rep.
Paul).
The Australians dislike the popular IRS reference to taxpayers as “customers” because, as
the ANAO [Australian National Audit Office] recently observed, the word client “better
reflects the fact that they have tax obligations which they meet through their dealings
with the ATO [Australian Taxation Office] and that their interaction is largely on an
involuntary basis.”
Ryan J. Donmoyer, Restructuring the Tax Collector, Aussie-Style, 78 TAX NOTES 295, 296 (1998).
100. See Despite Efforts to Better Serve Taxpayers, Many IRS Employees Receive Abuse at
Hands of Dissatisfied “Customers”, (Mar. 24, 1988), LEXIS, 88 TNT 66-20 [hereinafter
Dissatisfied “Customers”] (“Until 1986, no IRS commissioner had ever referred to taxpayers as
‘customers.’ However, since taking the reigns of the Service two years ago, Lawrence B. Gibbs has
made high quality ‘customer service’ chief among his initiatives.”).
101. See Professional Employees, Taxpayer Rights Dominate 1989 Commissioner’s Advisory
Group Agenda (Jan. 23, 1989), LEXIS, 89 TNT 17-9 (“IRS Commissioner Lawrence B. Gibbs set
the tone for this year’s Commissioner’s Advisory Group . . . agenda by borrowing heavily from
private sector management concepts, such as customer service, quality control, product
development, and budget resources, when discussing the IRS’ strategic management plan. Speaking
on January 18 at the Atlanta Service Center . . . meetings, Gibbs repeatedly referred to the IRS’ need
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from a focus on “customer service,” a more customary phrase than
“client service.”102
Does customer service in tax collection affect compliance? The
results of experiments conducted by the Minnesota Department of
Revenue and the IRS suggest that better service does not increase
compliance.103 In the Minnesota study, taxpayers in a “service group”
were mailed a letter offering them an increased level of service by the
Minnesota Department of Revenue.104 They were sent a special phone
to provide better service ‘to our customers’ [taxpayers] to produce a better ‘product’ [returns
processing].”). Senator David Pryor, who ran the IRS hearings of the late 1980s, agreed with the
idea. See Jack Teuber, An Interview with Senator David Pryor, 35 TAX NOTES 636, 638 (1987)
(“[Gibbs] keeps talking about wanting to treat the taxpayer as a customer. We want to put that in
language. We want it in the statute. We don’t want it in some molded, mildewed manual sitting up
here in his office, like some kind of a Magna Carta.”).
The “customer” nomenclature fell into disuse after Gibbs’ tenure. See Internal Revenue
Service Oral History Interview with Mortimer M. Caplin Commissioner, February 7, 1961-July 10,
1964, conducted November 18, 19, and 25, 1991 in Mr. Caplin’s Office, Washington, D.C. by
Shelley L. Davis, IRS Historian and Kecia L. McDonald, Student Intern (June 22, 1994), LEXIS, 94
TNT 120-25 (“CAPLIN: . . . Was it Larry Gibbs who kept referring to the taxpayers as customers?
(laughs) I don’t know if I’d use that word, but he was very successful in what he did. DAVIS: I
don’t think that’s being used quite as frequently anymore.”). The government repopularized it in the
movement for reform that led to RRA ’98. See Senate Passes Antibrowsing Bill (Apr. 25, 1997),
LEXIS, 97 TNT 80-42 (“During this morning’s [April 1997] hearing, Treasury officials kept
referring to taxpayers as ‘customers’.”) (statement of Senator Campbell).
102. See Dissatisfied “Customers,” supra note 100 (then-Commissioner “[Larry Gibbs] has
[stressed] . . . ‘customer service’ [as] chief among his initiatives.”). The comparison to private
sector business and the use of customer service principles makes sense in the context of the taxpayer
help line, for example. The IRS’s help line has traditionally provided notoriously bad service. See
Rossotti, supra note 8, at 1203 (“Typically, . . . operations [in leading businesses] have a level of
service such that a customer has a 90 to 95% chance of getting through on a given telephone call.
As recently as 1997, the chances of getting through on the IRS toll-free number were 51%.”); Mohr,
supra note 36, at 206 (“testimony from Treasury Inspector General David C. Williams cited IRS
customer service as a constant problem. The department reached IRS representatives only 37% of
the time while conducting an audit. Further, representatives responded incorrectly to 47% of the
questions that were modeled directly from the IRS’s List of Frequently Asked Questions.”). Yet the
use of customer service concepts seems to make little sense outside of the arena in which the IRS
actually provides service to taxpayers. As one observer commented, “you don’t arrest your
customers, do you?” Christopher Bergin, Tax Analyst Executive Director Addresses IRS’s Split
Personality, 95 TAX NOTES 1266, 1267 (2002).
103. An earlier study that made use of interviews of taxpayers conducted by Louis Harris and
Associates, Inc. for the IRS, see Smith, supra note 94, at 229, found that “[r]esponsive service has a
strong, positive effect on perceptions of procedural fairness, but it has no effects on other variables
net those of procedural fairness . . . . In sum, responsive service appears to be a very important
factor affecting perceptions of procedural fairness, perhaps almost a precondition; but the effect of
these two positive incentives on other variables is entirely through perceptions of procedural
fairness.” Id. at 242. This study is discussed further below. See infra text accompanying notes 136,
139.
104. STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME
TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 4 (Apr. 1996), available at
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number that they could use for assistance with federal as well as state tax
returns.105 Normally, the Minnesota Department of Revenue did not
provide assistance with federal taxes.106 The hours of operation were the
same as the hours of operation of the regular help line but represented an
increase over prior years.107 This strategy, unlike certain other strategies
tested in the study,108 had little effect on compliance.109
The results of the IRS study are consistent with this—that study
found that taxpayer phone calls to the help line had no measurable
impact on voluntary compliance.110 In addition, the IRS study found that
its speed of issuing refunds, the volume of the Taxpayer Service office’s
correspondence with taxpayers, and IRS educational outreach efforts all
had no measurable effect on voluntary compliance.111
Furthermore, in Minnesota, taxpayers in a “redesigned form” group
received an expanded form (two pages instead of one) that facilitated
additions and subtractions on the return without the necessity of referring
to the instruction booklet or using worksheets.112 Only taxpayers who
had not used a return preparer for their 1993 tax return were sent the
special form.113 The form was sent to a group consisting of taxpayers
who had made an addition or subtraction on their 1993 returns and to a

http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes/legal_policy/research_reports/content/complnce.pdf (last visited
August 22, 2003).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 5.
108. The study found that a letter threatening audit was effective with respect to low-and middleincome taxpayers (approximately 96.7% of the population) and a letter making a norms-based appeal
had a modest effect overall and a greater effect on certain subgroups. See id. at 10, 18–19 (reporting
results of study); see also Lederman, supra note 14 (discussing the Minnesota study in more detail).
109. Coleman, supra note 104, at 16. There was a possible effect of service on two subgroups in
which taxpayers were in the low-risk, low-income category. One of those two groups resulted in a
larger increase in income and reported taxes than the control and the other had the opposite effect,
approximately canceling each other out. Id. Interestingly, the average refund claimed was larger for
this group than for the control group (by $33), which in turn was larger than the average refund
claimed by the group that received the norms letter (by $12). Id. at 18.
110. Plumley, supra note 82, at ¶ 18. In fact, “telephone calls that TPS [Taxpayer Service]
handles [had] a weakly significant negative impact on income reporting.” Plumley, supra note 5, at
37 (emphasis in original).
111. Plumley, supra note 5, at 39. These are strategies that revenue authorities may be inclined
to use. For example, as part of a multi-part strategy, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue
“engaged in a public education program with the theme that tax evasion is not a victimless crime and
that both honest taxpayers and citizens dependent on government services suffer from tax evasion,”
Robert M. Melia, Is the Pen Mightier than the Audit?, 34 TAX NOTES 1309, 1314 (1987), as well as
“a major customer service program, including user-friendly forms, a vastly improved Taxpayer
Assistance Bureau, record fast refunds, and outreach programs . . . ,” id.
112. Coleman, supra note 104, at 6–7.
113. Id. at 6.
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group consisting of those who had not.114 The revised form also
produced little overall difference in additions, subtractions, or taxes.115
Similarly, an Australian Centre for Tax System Integrity study that
involved sending certain taxpayers with rental property a schedule to
complete found that sending the schedule made no difference in the
magnitude of deductions claimed where the taxpayers were not required
to return the schedule.116 Thus, at least as measured thus far, increased
114. Id.
115. Id. at 21. More important with respect to forms may be ensuring that information returns
are designed to obtain information that can be matched to taxpayer returns. This is an issue for
Schedule K-1, which reports information about “pass throughs” from Subchapter S corporations and
partnerships. “The IRS estimates that $1.1 trillion in income goes through passthrough entities.”
George Guttman, Why Did the K-1 Matching Program Go Awry?, 97 TAX NOTES 736, 736 (2002).
IRS matching of K-1s to return is more complex than other contexts involving information returns
because K-1s list multiple sources of income. IRS Announces Launch of Enhanced Schedule K-1
Compliance Effort, 96 TAX NOTES 202, 202 (2002). One of the issues the IRS faces is the inability
to match K-1s directly with taxpayer returns because a number of the items on K-1s must be
adjusted to take account of various rules applicable to individuals before being reported on returns.
Christopher S. Bond, Bond Release on His Letter to IRS on Schedule K-1 Matching Problems at ¶ 5
(July 26, 2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 144-33. In other words, unlike typical return matching where a
mismatch typically reveals an error by the payor or taxpayer, a mismatch may reflect no error on
either part because of underlying tax law that affects the proper treatment on the taxpayer’s return.
The IRS began a K-1 compliance program in 2002, which involved matching K-1s, along
with other information returns, to taxpayers’ returns. See id. The IRS found in its early results of
65,000 notices sent out by July 2002 that a lot of the misreporting was due to erroneous taxpayer
netting of gains and losses. Amy Hamilton, IRS’s K-1 Matching Program Puts 65,000 Taxpayers on
Notice at ¶ 3 (July 10, 2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 132-6. However, the IRS suspended the program
on August 1, 2002, in response to a request from Senator Kit Bond, following taxpayer complaints.
See Sheryl Stratton, IRS Stops Sending K-1 Mismatch Notices, 96 TAX NOTES 1038, 1038 (2002).
The argument made was that there was a potential burden on small business owners, particularly
because the IRS could not always tell from return matching whether or not items had been correctly
reported. Bond, supra, at ¶ 6. This area is therefore ripe for improvement of the return-matching
process, which may require modification of the reporting process to reflect on the K-1 what will be
shown on the taxpayer’s return. Senator Kit Bond
urged the IRS to help taxpayers report the information from the Schedule K-1 in a
manner that will allow the agency to verify its accuracy and enable taxpayers to avoid a
matching-error notice in the future. “Ideally, this should be accomplished by modifying
Form 1040 so that taxpayers can directly report the information from the Schedule K-1.”
Id. at ¶ 7.
The IRS subsequently announced that it would resume the matching program using
additional filters during the screening process. See IRS Resumes K-1 Matching Program, Says
Form, Schedule E Will Be Revised, BNA Daily Tax Report G-1 (Mar. 11, 2003). It also announced
“longer term plans” to redesign both Schedule K-1 and Schedule E of Form 1040. See id. Part II of
Schedule E is used to report income and loss from partnerships and S corporations. Form 1040
Schedule E, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040se.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
116. See generally Natalie Taylor & Michael Wenzel, The Effects of Different Letter Styles on
Reported Rental Income and Rental Deductions: An Experimental Approach, Centre for Tax System
Integrity, Working Paper No. 11 (July 2001), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/WP11.pdf (reporting
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service to taxpayers, in an effort to help them fulfill their compliance
obligations, does not seem to affect compliance.
B. Procedural Fairness
An important focus of RRA ’98 was procedural fairness to
taxpayers.117 Professor Eric Posner has argued that taxpayers may use
tax compliance as a “signal,” that they will cooperate with others.118 As
part of that argument, he has argued that the government can serve as a
focal point for that signaling—establishing that tax compliance, not
noncompliance, is what good types do—by indicating that the
government itself has a low discount rate (that is, a long-term view).119
Accordingly, he has argued that taxpayer rights legislation such as RRA
’98 is a way in which the government not only signals its own
cooperation but also serves as a focal point for private signaling:120
Very generous, even wastefully generous, procedures are signals that IRS
officials, or their political superiors, belong to the good type. The more
wasteful the procedures are, the better. Face-to-face contact, hand-holding,
on an experimental study conducted to investigate such effects). This study is discussed further
below. See infra notes 160–68 and accompanying text.
117. Procedural fairness encompasses “how much opportunity individuals (or other entities)
have to tell their side of the issue, how hard the authorities try to be fair to individuals, how
correctable decisions are, and how equitably and consistently individuals are treated.” Smith, supra
note 95, at 224. RRA ’98 included new “collection due process” procedures as well as other
provisions focused on fairness. See RRA ’98, supra note 9, § 3401 (collection due process); id. §
1203(b) (“ten deadly sins” of IRS employees); id. §§ 3000-3804 (Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3).
118. Posner’s signaling model imagines a society in which “[e]ach individual periodically
matches up with some other individual in order to engage in a ‘cooperative relationship.’ A
cooperative relationship, which may be commercial, social, or intimate, has the structure of a
repeated prisoner’s dilemma (‘PD’).” Posner, supra note 17, at 1786. Key to the model is the
assumption:
that players have different time preferences. “Bad types” have high discount rates,
meaning that they value future payoffs relatively little compared to current payoffs.
“Good types” have low discount rates. The standard result in the repeated PD model is
that a necessary condition of cooperation is that both players have a sufficiently low
discount rate. Thus, those who consistently cooperate are more likely to develop
reputations for being good types, and those who cheat are more likely to develop
reputations for being bad types.
Id. at 1786–87.
Because Posner’s model assumes that each individual in the society has private information
about his or her own time preference, individuals need a way to convince others that they have a low
discount rate, in order to get others to enter relationships with them. “Signals” are costly, observable
behaviors that provide no benefit to the signaler other than providing information and therefore are
more reliable than cheap talk. Id. at 1787.
119. Id. at 1792.
120. Id. at 1799.
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generous rights to appeal, restrictions on the use of confidential records, and
other procedures—even, or especially, if tending only to hamper the IRS
without giving the taxpayer concrete benefits—create warm feelings of trust in
the heart of the taxpaying citizen. These procedures show straightforwardly that
the government is willing to sacrifice short-term gains, which can only be true
of a government with a low discount rate.121

Professor Posner’s signaling argument has been widely criticized,
both with respect to tax compliance122 and more generally.123 The use of
tax compliance as a signal seems particularly unlikely because of the
legal protection afforded tax returns and return information124 and the
lack of any norm of disclosing to others in business negotiations, for
example, tax returns (let alone the supporting documentation necessary
to corroborate the reporting).125 Given the uselessness of tax compliance
as a signal, the government’s wastefulness of resources in a
demonstration of cooperation with taxpayers should be similarly useless
to spur taxpayer “good type” behavior.

121. Id. at 1800; cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2000) (noting that governments
do not necessarily act like private firms with respect to costs and benefits).
In contrast to Posner’s theory, Kent Smith hypothesized that “[c]itizens . . . are more likely
to take their taxpaying obligations seriously if they perceive that the state does also. A primary
indicator of the state’s interest is its concern with detecting and punishing noncompliance.” Smith,
supra note 94, at 240 fig. 1, 241. Smith’s analysis of survey data found that a higher belief in the
perceived likelihood that small tax cheaters would be caught decreased the normative acceptability
of underreporting. Id. at 244 fig. 2, 245. See also Lederman, supra note 14 (arguing that
enforcement is required to sustain compliance norms).
122. See Lederman, supra note 14; Kahan, supra note 17; Russell Hardin, Law and Social
Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REV. 1821 (2000).
123. See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, Cyberian Signals, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 327, 327 (2002)
(testing “Posner’s theory by examining how well it explains the emergence of Web site privacy
norms” and concluding that the “new norms are not the best understood as collections of signals.”);
Kahan, supra note 17, at 368 (arguing that Posner’s model fairs poorly under the theories of
behavior realism, political feasibility, and moral acceptability); Paul G. Mahoney, Norms and
Signals: Some Skeptical Observations, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 387, 405 (arguing that Posner’s theory is
too broad and thus is less convincing as an explanation for specific situations); Tracey L. Meares,
Signaling, Legitimacy, and Compliance: A Comment on Posner’s Law and Social Norms and
Criminal Law Policy, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 421 (arguing that Posner’s theory is incomplete with
regard to “criminal law policy where it is most needed—addressing the racial dynamics of criminal
punishment and crime reduction in high-crime neighborhoods”).
124. See I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7431.
125. See Kahan, supra note 17, at 379 (“[A]nyone who showed up at a commercial negotiation
eager to display his or her latest tax returns would probably be regarded not as a trustworthy
business partner but as some kind of freak.”).

998

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

Yet, the perceived fairness of IRS procedures may affect taxpayer
attitudes to the IRS and perhaps thereby affect tax compliance.126
Professor Posner further argues that we can
imagine how government officials would behave if they did not have to send
signals. They would presumably raise revenues using the most efficient tax
system available. Such a system might not resemble the one we have today, for
tax collectors probably would dispense with due process, politeness, and
evenhandedness.
More generally, “good tax-collecting behavior” is
maintaining confidential information, refraining from threats and intimidation,
keeping the tax payment process as simple as possible, and avoiding intrusion
as much as possible.127

In fact, it is unlikely that the government would succeed in
dispensing with due process and fairness for very long. Citizens tend to
respond to enforcement that they deem overzealous by protesting or
rebelling, impeding tax collection.128 The televised IRS hearings, which
included “horror stories” told by taxpayers,129 are an example of an
effort, coordinated by Congress, to enact legislation restricting aspects of
tax collection.130 Taxpayers are also quick to respond to what they deem

126. See Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of
Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 261, supra note 23 (citing and discussing literature); cf.
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 40, 64–68, 172–73 (1990) (stating that legitimacy of
authority impacts self-reported compliance with laws such as speeding, driving while intoxicated,
and shoplifting, and that procedural fairness is key in maintaining legitimacy); Gary E. Bolton et. al.,
Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries, (2000) (Working Paper), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=254871 (providing evidence from experimental
games that a fair procedure can substitute for a fair outcome).
127. Posner, supra note 17, at 1799.
128. See Smith, supra note 94, at 227 (“authorities’ unresponsive, disrespectful, and unfair
treatment of taxpayers fosters disrespect for and rebellion against tax authorities and tax laws.”).
The paradigm developed by Yoram Barzel supports this notion. See generally YORAM BARZEL, A
THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS, AND THE SCOPE OF THE STATE (2002).
Although Barzel does not address taxes, the idea in the tax context is that the sovereign, who seeks
to maximize his wealth, must strike a balance that will optimize revenue, given the tax system and
enforcement costs. Under-enforcement will not produce as much revenue as is possible, as evasion
will not be optimally detected or deterred but over-enforcement will result in resistance by
taxpayers.
129. See supra notes 44–45, and accompanying text.
130. See dust jacket of ROTH, JR. & NIXON, supra note 45 (“In 1997, [Senator] William Roth
spearheaded the most extensive tax collection reform effort in modern history. He initiated an
investigation into the IRS and chaired congressional hearings that uncovered horrifying stories of
abuses against taxpayers that shocked the nation. The legislation that resulted—the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring [sic] Act—which passed the Senate unanimously in 1998—has
ushered in what The New York Times called ‘the most sweeping changes in decades to an agency
whose very function has long made it the most reviled in government.’”).
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violations of the “good tax-collecting behavior”131 of protection of
confidential information.132
131. Posner, supra note 17, at 1799.
132. The federal government periodically has enacted laws that required publicity of tax returns
or return information, often with the purpose of discouraging tax avoidance or evasion. MARK H.
LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933–1939 68–69
(1984); Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the
Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 689–90 (1989); Richard D. Pomp, The
Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data: Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U.
L. REV. 374, 378–406 (1993); see generally Marjorie Kornhauser, More Historical Perspective on
Publication of Corporate Returns, 96 TAX NOTES 745 (2002). Typically, taxpayers objected and the
law in question was quickly repealed. Id. at 745; see also Leff, supra, at 70 (discussing repeal of
“pink slip” provision).
Today, the Code provides strict protection of all aspects of a taxpayer’s “return
information,” broadly defined. See I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7213, 7431. In fact, the broad language of
section 6103 sparked litigation over whether press releases publicizing such things as specific
criminal tax convictions violate section 6103 even if they contain only information already in the
public record. See, e.g., Rice v. United States, 166 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Sawyer,
120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1993)
(reports to tax shelter investors of criminal tax convictions without mentioning reversal of those
convictions); Barnes v. United States, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21633 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (press release
after grand jury indictment of taxpayer); Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988)
(variety of press releases in consolidated cases). Section 6103 does not explicitly contain a “public
record” exception but some courts have found one, at least in some contexts. See Rowley v. United
States, 76 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1996) (filing of notice of federal tax lien); Schrambling Accountancy
Corp. v. United States, 937 F.2d 1485, 1489–90 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338
(“Once tax return information is made a part of the public domain, the taxpayer may no longer claim
a right of privacy in that information.”). Others have carved out an exception where the direct
source of the information was the public record. See, e.g., Rice, 116 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 1999)
(source of information was IRS press release); Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir.
1989) (source of information was Tax Court opinion, so there was no violation of section 6103); cf.
Johnson, 120 F.3d, at 1321 n.1 (“[w]e are not holding that the IRS, or any other federal agency, is
prohibited from publishing the contents of a public record, such as a judicial opinion, . . . provided it
is the public record that is the immediate source.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). For
further discussion of this issue, see generally Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax
Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1105 (2003).
The idea of disclosure of tax returns periodically resurfaces. See, e.g., Marc Linder, Tax
Glasnost For Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy
Continuum, 18 REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 951, 977 (1990-91) (proposing disclosure of
millionaires’ returns). Most recently, it was proposed for corporations, which is not surprising in
light of the spate of corporate accounting scandals. Senator Charles Grassley and others argued that
corporate taxpayers should be required to disclose their returns in order to shed light on
tax/accounting discrepancies. See Grassley Raises Public Disclosure of Some Corporate Tax
Returns (July 8, 2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 131-16 (discussing the disclosure of corporate tax
returns); Alan Murray Companies Should Close Credibility Gap in Books, THE WALL ST. J., July 2,
2002; see also Sheryl Stratton, Closing the Credibility Gap by Disclosing Corporate Returns, 96
TAX NOTES 322, 322 (2002). Professor Theodore Sims took it further, and, arguing that disclosure
could be used to discourage tax evasion by corporations, suggested private enforcement encouraged
by the payment of bounties by corporate taxpayers for each deficiency sustained. Theodore S. Sims,
Corporate Returns: Beyond Disclosure, 96 TAX NOTES 735, 736–37 (2002) (discussing Sims’
proposal). His article sparked a debate. See Allen D. Madison, Don’t Publicize Corporate Tax
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With respect to areas of law other than tax compliance, Tom Tyler
has shown that perceptions of procedural fairness impact compliance,133
although the impact may be attenuated.134 Given those findings and
evident taxpayer willingness to oppose strongly perceived procedural
unfairness on the part of the IRS, it seems likely that procedural fairness
may impact tax compliance or at least normative commitments to
compliance.135 Two studies suggest that the latter relationship exists. A
study by Kent Smith found evidence that a higher level of perceived
procedural fairness correlated with a lower normative acceptability of tax
evasion.136 Similarly, Karyl Kinsey found that hearing from other people
reports of unfair treatment by the IRS increased taxpayers’ intentions of
future noncompliance.137
To what extent does increased acceptability of tax evasion or the
intention not to comply correspond to actual noncompliance?138 Neither
Returns or Privatize Enforcement, 22 ABA Tax Sec. News Q. 15 (2002); Theodore S. Sims, Private
Auditing Makes Sense, 22 ABA Tax Sec. News Q. 17 (2002).
133. See generally Tyler, supra note 126 (discussing why Americans generally obey the law).
134. See ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
80–81 (discussing Tyler’s Chicago study and stating, “[b]ecause compliance is affected only weakly
by legitimacy, which itself is only moderately affected by procedural justice judgments, the
procedural justice to compliance causal chain is not strong. The erosion of obedience to law just
posited is supported by the data, but it is likely to be a gradual erosion.”).
135. Occasionally, an attempt at procedural fairness may have negative side-effects. An
example is the “third party contact” provision of RRA ’98 that requires the IRS to notify the
taxpayer before contacting a third party about the taxpayer’s tax liability. I.R.C. § 7602(c); RRA
’98, supra note 9, § 3412. As discussed above, the IRS uses information return matching to check
compliance. See supra text accompanying notes 24–26. Unfortunately, any mismatch between an
information return and a taxpayer’s return does not tell the IRS whether there is an error on the
taxpayer’s return. For example, it is possible that the information return is incorrect (such as
mistaken in amount). E.g., Portillo v. Comm’r, 932 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1991) (provider of late 1099
form could not substantiate $21,380 of payments allegedly made in cash that the taxpayer denied
receiving).
A logical approach for an IRS agent working on a mismatch would be to contact the payor
to verify that the payor believes the information reported to be correct. IRS, Substitute for Return
May Consider Partnership Income, Ignore Deductions at n.2 (Oct. 22, 2001), LEXIS, 2001 TNT
204–23. However, given the third party contact provision, the IRS is required to contact the
taxpayer. Once the IRS contacts the taxpayer, it is more efficient for the IRS to question the
taxpayer about the mismatch. This may create ill-will where the error is the payor’s rather than the
taxpayer’s.
136. See Smith, supra note 94, at 243 tbl. 2, 244 fig. 2, 245.
137. Kinsey, supra note 126, at 281.
138. A study by Harold Grasmick and Wilbur Scott found that a higher percentage of people
admitted the possibility of future noncompliance with tax laws than admitted past noncompliance,
but the reverse was true for theft. See Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and
Mechanisms of Social Control: A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. ECON. PSYCH. 213,
220 (1982); cf. Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do
New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 10–11 &
fig. 1, supra note 23 (discussing and illustrating a “tax schema” that “assumes that personal, social,
and legal inhibitors affect a taxpayer’s commitment to comply, which in turn affects compliance.”).
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the Smith study nor the Kinsey study reported a direct relationship
between perceived procedural fairness and noncompliance.139 A study
by John Scholz and Mark Lubell using survey data found that greater
“trust in government” corresponded to significantly lower self-reported
noncompliance.140 However, that study did not isolate procedural
fairness; the two statements used in the studys survey were broad ones
from national election surveys (“you can generally trust the government
to do what’s right” and “dishonesty in government is pretty rare”),141 so
the results are not directly on point.142
139. Kinsey’s study appears not to have tested this. See generally Kinsey, supra note 126. Her
forward-looking compliance variable related to stated intentions. See id. at 266. Smith’s study
found no effect of procedural fairness on his variable for noncompliance, which consisted of selfreports of underreporting of income in the previous five years, see Smith, supra note 21, at 235).
See Richard Lempert, Commentary on Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives
for Tax Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 225, supra note 23; see also id. at 240 fig. 1 (not
hypothesizing a direct relationship); id. at 243 tbl. 2 (not reporting having tested for such a
relationship); id. at 244 fig. 2 (not reporting any such relationship); but cf. id. at 241 (“I am including
[self-reported underreported income] to explore whether procedural fairness and the other variables
in the expanded model have direct effects on underreported income net those of opportunity,
likelihood of catching small cheaters, and the acceptability of cheating.”).
140. John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to
Collective Action, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 398, 404, 409 tbl. 1 (1998).
The survey was conducted in 1988 and focused on the previous three years. Id. at 402–03.
The questions posed did not distinguish between unintentional noncompliance (presumably
discovered later) and intentional tax evasion. Id. The questions were framed in terms designed to
reduce response bias resulting from the lack of social acceptability of tax evasion. Id. at 402. Thus,
the answer choices were “‘definitely did (report all income)’ through ‘probably did’ and ‘probably
did not.’ To ‘definitely did not’” Id. For the same reason, any answer other than “definitely did”
(report honestly) was recorded as noncompliance. Id. The authors “presume” that the survey
answers do not reflect unintentional noncompliance. Id. at 403 n.2. However, that is impossible to
tell from the data. Cf. Lempert, supra note 139, at 252 (critiquing a similar four-point scale, stating,
“I have the nagging feeling that . . . ‘probably have not’ [omitted even a minor amount of reportable
income] is a denial equivalent to ‘I am only slightly pregnant’” and pointing out that unintentionally
omitted items may be discovered by a taxpayer in the course of preparing a subsequent return and
comparing it to the prior one).
The authors also found that the measured level of noncompliance corresponded to a
measure from the 1985 TCMP. Scholz & Lubell, supra, at 403 n.2. That measure used as the
numerator returns reflecting underreporting less those reflecting overreporting, on the assumption
that overreporting is unintentional and unintentional noncompliance is randomly distributed. See id.;
Karyl A. Kinsey, foreword to SURVEY DATA ON NONCOMPLIANCE: A COMPENDIUM AND REVIEW,
at 1 (American Bar Foundation, Working Paper No. 8716). However, the results of taxpayer surveys
suggest that a substantial number of taxpayers intentionally fail to take deductions to which they are
entitled. Kinsey, supra, Foreword at 1, 21. In addition, unintentional noncompliance may not be
randomly distributed because poor recordkeeping could result in bias toward underreporting. Id. at 6
n.3. Kinsey reports that IRS personnel expressed doubts about the validity of the approach of
subtracting returns with overreporting from those with underreporting. Id. Foreword at 2.
141. See Scholz & Lubell, supra note 141, at 404. The discussion of the use of these questions
stated, “[t]he heuristic model suggests that trust in government serves as very rough proxy for [sic]
ratio of tax costs to public goods benefits that [sic] is so difficult to evaluate for federal income tax.”
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An Australian study compared the filing and payment compliance
with respect to “Activity Statements”143 of recipients of a standard letter
with recipients of letters designed to reflect two different types of
procedural fairness.144 One set of letters focused on “informational
justice”—the provision and transparency of explanations about
Id. The “ratio of tax costs to public goods benefits” should relate to “distributive justice” rather than
procedural fairness. See Steenbergen et al., supra note 138, at 15 (defining “distributive justice” as
“the fairness of outcomes, which include both rewards or resources and burdens or responsibilities”
and distinguishing this from procedural fairness).
142. The study involved survey data from a project focusing on the effects of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 on “taxpayer beliefs, attitudes and behavior.” Scholz & Lubell, supra note 140, at 401.
It included a question for “procedural fairness of tax policy.” See id. at 404–05 n.4 (“Another
question [sic] to tap procedural fairness of tax policy asked how well ‘people of your income group’
were represented when Congress was considering the law.”). However, procedural fairness with
respect to the passage of legislation is very different from procedural fairness in enforcement of the
laws.
A study on the effects of substantive unfairness in law on noncompliance raises questions
about the effects of perceived substantive unfairness in tax law on the commitment to tax
compliance. Professor Janice Nadler conducted an experiment that found that exposure through
newspaper stories to an emphasis of the unfairness of laws relating to civil forfeiture, income taxes,
or landlord searches of tenants’ apartments affected college students’ stated willingness to drive
while intoxicated, park in a no-parking zone, fail to pay taxes, illegally copy software, speed, drink
alcohol although underage, and take office supplies home for personal use. Janice Nadler, Flouting
the Law: Does Perceived Injustice Provoke General Non-Compliance? at 11–13 (Northwestern
Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-9, Apr. 1, 2002), at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=353745 (last visited August 17, 2003). The study reported that the
exposure to unfairness in one set of laws increased the willingness to violate unrelated laws. Id. at
15. Tax laws were the only laws included in both parts of the study. Despite this correlation,
participants exposed to unfairness in the law were not more willing to violate tax laws than those
exposed to the versions of the newspaper stories emphasizing fairness. Id. at 29 n.49. Surprisingly,
willingness to comply with tax laws was the only criminal behavior tested that did not show the
expected correspondence. Id. at 14 fig. 1, 29 n.49. Professor Nadler suggests that the unfairness
“priming” may have been ineffective with respect to tax laws because the study participants were
aware of the similarity between the news story and the tax compliance question. Id. at 29 n.49.
However, in response to her exit questionnaire, participants stated that they had participated in two
studies and that the first study did not affect their judgments in the second study. Id. at 13.
Professor Nadler also notes that the study participants were college students who likely had little
experience with filing tax returns. Id. at 29 n.49.
143. Activity Statements are tax returns that businesses that are liable for the Goods and Services
Tax (GST) use to report their tax liabilities. See Michael Wenzel, Centre for Tax System Integrity,
Principles of Procedural Fairness in Reminder Letters: An Experimental Study, 5 (Working Paper
No. 42, Dec. 2002) [hereinafter Wenzel, An Experimental Study], at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/
UP.Wenzel.reminder.doc (last visited Apr. 7, 2003) (stating that “Business Activity Statements
(BAS) have to be used by businesses to report on, next to other things, GST and/or PAYG [Pay As
You Go] installments payable to the Tax Office. Installment Activity Statements (IAS) are required
for PAYG installments only.”).
144. See generally id. The study was preceded by a prestudy on economics students that tested
the perceived fairness of the letters and hypothetical compliance. See generally Michael Wenzel,
Centre for Tax System Integrity, Principles of Procedural Fairness in Reminder Letters and
Awareness of Entitlements: A Prestudy (Working Paper No. 10, June 2001), at
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/WP10.pdf. (last visited August 22, 2003). Interestingly, the prestudy did not
find any impact of the letters on hypothetical compliance. Id. at 17.
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procedures and decisions145—and another set concerned “interpersonal
justice,”146 which refers to “politeness and respect, sensitivity to people’s
feelings and consideration of their circumstances.”147 The study found
that letters reflecting a format focused on procedural fairness had a
modest effect on filing compliance with respect to individual
taxpayers.148 However, for entities, “the reference to an interpersonal
right tended to have a positive impact, but the combination of
informational message and an informational right being made salient was
counterproductive.”149 With respect to payment compliance, the study
found some evidence that, with respect to individual taxpayers, the
informational fairness letter that also referenced principles of
informational rights increased compliance, but the opposite was true for
entities.150

145. Wenzel, An Experimental Study, supra note 143, at 3 (citing Jerald Greenberg, The Social
Side of Fairness: Interpersonal and Informational Classes of Organizational Justice, in JUSTICE IN
THE WORKPLACE: APPROACHING FAIRNESS IN HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 77–103 (E.
Cropanzano ed., 1993).
146. Id. at 4 (citing Greenberg, supra note 145).
147. Id. The experiment involved a total of nine different letters because each of the three letter
formats (informational justice, interpersonal justice and the standard letter) were matched with three
types of content: a reference to either informational or interpersonal fairness principles discussed in
Australia’s “Taxpayers’ Charter” (which “outlines ‘the legal rights and standards taxpayers can
expect from the Tax Office,’” id. at 4, citing Australian Taxation Office “The Taxpayers’ Charter”
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia 1997) at 8), or no reference to fairness principles. Id. at 4, 7.
Each letter was sent to 500 randomly selected taxpayers that had an overdue “Activity Statement”
for the third quarter of 2001. Id. at 2, 6–7. Large companies and taxpayers registered with a tax
agent or accountant for Activity Statement purposes were excluded from the samples so as to focus
on self-preparers. Id. at 2, 7. In addition, to minimize confusion, the samples were restricted to “(a)
clients had only ever had quarterly obligations; (b) clients had no other AS [Activity Statement]
outstanding; (c) clients had only one known concurrent AS obligation.” Id. at 7. In addition,
taxpayers from Western Australia were not included. Id.
148. Id. at 16. Controlling for background difference of taxpayers, such as previous filing
compliance history, letter format had “overall, a marginally significant effect, Wald (2) = 4.65, p =
.098,” and the letter content was not significant. Id. at 14.
149. Id. at 16.
150. Id. at 18, 20. The experiment also tracked telephone calls in response to the letters. With
respect to those calls, the study concluded:
The data on return phone calls indicated some advantages of reminder letters that adopted
principles of informational fairness. There tended to be fewer return calls overall when
the letter message was informationally fair; fewer excuses and fewer requests for delayed
lodgment when an informational right was granted; and fewer accusations when an
informational letter matched an informational right. However, the effects were not
completely clear and rather suggestive.
Id. at 13.
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Another Australian study considered the role of social identity; fair
treatment by an authority may matter with respect to a group to which
both the authority and the affected person belong.151 That study found
that taxpayers’ responses to survey questions152 indicated that two of the
four types of tax compliance behavior questioned,153 reporting of “extra
income” and claiming of deductions, were influenced by taxpayers’
perceptions of justice if they identified themselves as part of the
Australian community.154 Overall, the Australian research suggests the
possibility that, for individuals, at least with those who identify with the
country to which they pay taxes, tax collector efforts at procedural
fairness may affect compliance.155 Research on this issue with respect to
IRS contacts of United States taxpayers would be helpful.
C. Tone of IRS Communications
As the Australian study on procedural fairness discussed above
suggests, the tone of letters from a tax collector may affect compliance
behavior.156 “After the IRS sends the first contact letter, it often sends a
second one that is more stern than the first. It goes out automatically and
does not take into account any action a taxpayer may have taken in

151. See Michael Wenzel, The Impact of Outcome Orientation and Justice Concerns on Tax
Compliance: The Role of Taxpayers’ Identity, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 631 (2002) [hereinafter
Role of Taxpayers’ Identity] (citing LIND & TYLER, supra note 134) (discussing the connection
between taxpayer identity and levels of compliance in Australia); see also Tyler, supra note 126, at
174–76.
152. The survey addressed the 1998–99 tax year and included both yes/no questions, such as
“‘[a]s far as you know, did you report all the money you earned in your 1998–99 income tax
return?’” and questions with answers provided on a five-point scale, such as “[p]eople earn money
from many different sources . . . Think about each of the sources of income listed below, and select
the response that best describes your 1998–99 income tax return, (1 = received none, 2 = did not
declare it, 3 = declared some, 4 = declared most, 5 = declared all) . . . .” Wenzel, Role of
Taxpayers’ Identity, supra note 151, at 644 app. The questionnaire apparently did not distinguish
between intentional evasion and unintentional noncompliance (later discovered). The sample size
was 7754 Australian citizens on the Australian electoral roll. Id. at 632. 7003 surveys were
successfully sent and 2040 surveys were turned in. Id.
153. The four types of tax compliance behavior asked about were reporting of remuneration
income, reporting of extra income, claiming of deductions, and the use of tax minimization
strategies. Id. at 634.
154. Id. at 636, 637. The procedural justice measures were based on responses to statements
such as “[t]he Tax Office respects the individual’s rights as a citizen,” . . . “[t]he Tax Office
considers the concerns of average citizens when making decisions,” and “[t]he Tax Office gives
equal consideration to the views of all Australians . . . .” Id. at 645.
155. The report on the study concluded, “[t]he present study yielded some, but largely patchy,
evidence for the assumption that procedural justice principles in reminder letters improve levels of
compliance with the reminders.” Id.
156. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text.
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response to the first letter.”157 Theoretically, stern letters may offend
compliant taxpayers:
Like [sic] in the United States, the only contact most Australians have with
their tax collector comes when they transmit a return. What [Peter] Simpson [a
“second commissioner” of the Australian Taxation Office] wants to change is
the tone the government can project when a taxpayer who has been compliant
for 30 years or more makes a mistake and gets a stern letter from the taxation
office. “People are saying, ‘we don’t want to be treated like that,’” Simpson
said. “We should be able to develop a rating system so that a computer spits out
an appropriate letter.”158

The Australian study involving letters sent to taxpayers with rental
property, discussed above,159 suggests that there may be no single answer
with respect to the best tone for communications from a tax collector.160
In that study, some taxpayers were sent a “soft” letter, focusing on the
helpfulness of the Australian Taxation Office, while others were sent a
“hard” letter emphasizing the possibility of audit and sanction.161 The
mailings also differed in content. Among other variations, some letters
included a rental property schedule to complete and return to the
Australian Taxation Office and some contained a schedule that did not
have to be returned, so as to see whether government oversight was a
factor in increasing compliance.162
157. Guttman, supra note 98, at 455.
158. Donmoyer, supra note 99, at 297–98.
159. See supra text accompanying note 116.
160. See Taylor & Wenzel, supra note 116, at 26 (generally finding no effect of tone and, in one
context, finding mixed results from different tones).
161. Id. at 9–11.
The ‘soft’ letters began with the sentence ‘At the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) we
are committed to helping taxpayers to correctly prepare their income tax returns’. The
emphasis in these letters was on the role of the Tax Office as being informative and
helpful. There was no mention of penalties or audit action. The ‘hard’ letters began with
‘Over the past few years the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has conducted an
extensive review program which has enabled us to collect and analyse rental property
income and deductions data. The program has resulted in a substantial number of
adjustments to rental property claims.’ These letters emphasised that taxpayers could be
selected for audit action, and that penalties for non-compliance could be imposed.
Id. at 10.
The letters were sent in June 2000 to a group of taxpayers that had been sent a
schedule to complete in previous years because their compliance appeared questionable
and a group that had not previously been sent the schedule. Id. at 9, 11.
162. Id. at 22.
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The study found that taxpayers in the group that was sent a schedule
to complete and return claimed fewer deductions than the controls.163 By
contrast, the tone of the letter generally made little difference.164
However, the study found an interesting interaction that was “marginally
significant.”165 For taxpayers who had been sent a schedule to complete
in a prior year because they were deemed at risk for noncompliance, the
hard letter resulted in fewer claimed rental deductions than the soft letter
when the schedule had to be returned.166 Yet, for that group of taxpayers,
when the schedule did not have to be returned, the reverse was true:
Those who received the soft letter claimed fewer rental deductions than
those receiving the hard letter.167 The experimenters suggest that either
(1) the hard letter was more consistent with the requirement of returning
the schedule and a soft letter is more consistent with not requiring the
schedule to be returned or (2) when taxpayers felt threatened
illegitimately, they claimed more deductions when they felt that they
were not under scrutiny.168
Thus, the Australian study suggests that tone may not matter or that
it may be best for a tax collection agency to adopt a tone suited to the
relevant context. The idea that softness on the part of a tax collection
agency may impede collection in contexts in which taxpayers are likely
to resist collection is intuitively plausible. For example, the failure to
pay over “trust fund” taxes (withheld by third party payors and owed to
the IRS169) is a large and growing problem.170 Often it is failing
163. Id. at 23. This was true whether they had received a schedule in a prior year or no, that is, it
was true for both the “at risk” group and the other group. Id.
164. Id. at 19, 26. The authors state that the distinction in the tone of the letters that were
intended to be “hard” and those intended to be “soft” might not have been as clear as intended. Id. at
26. They planned to pretest letters in the next phase of the study. Id.
165. It was significant at p = .067. Id. at 22.
166. Id. at 23.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 26.
169. These taxes are called “trust fund” taxes because the Code requires employers to hold these
amounts in “a special fund in trust for the United States.” I.R.C. § 7501.
170. Thirty-five to forty percent of the IRS’s delinquent accounts relate to businesses that fail to
pay over trust fund taxes. See ABA Commission Report, supra note 3, at 367. “IRS data show that
in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, delinquent employers owed about $3.2, $3.5, $4.4, and $5 billion,
respectively, in unpaid employment taxes, penalties, and interest.” GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS’S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COMPLIANCE WITH EMPLOYMENT TAX
REQUIREMENTS
SHOULD
BE
EVALUATED,
GAO-02-92,
1
(Jan.
2002),
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0292.pdf (last visited August 22, 2003) [hereinafter, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: EMPLOYMENT TAX]. It is not clear whether the amounts reported by the GAO
reflect possible assertion of the 100% penalty under I.R.C. § 6672 with respect to multiple
responsible persons. If the amounts include multiple assertions of the penalty, that would inflate
amounts apparently owed because it is the IRS’s policy to collect no more than the amount of the
delinquent employment taxes. See I.R.M. 1.2.1.5.14, P-5-60 (02-02-1993); see also Sixth Circuit
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businesses that do not pay over the taxes, essentially embezzling them as
a way to forestall closing down.171 The unpaid taxes and penalties
quickly snowball, compounding the tax liability.172 Yet, the IRS’s initial
notice in a case involving a failure to pay “trust fund” taxes simply asks
for an explanation for the delinquency.173 “If the employer fails to
respond to this first notice, IRS sends follow-up notices and may later
contact the employer by phone or, eventually, make a personal visit. . . .
[T]his entire process can take years for those employers who do not
respond. . . . ”174 Trust fund taxes are critical for the federal fisc175 so the
Denies Equitable Tolling in Bankruptcy, GLB 200038040, 2000 GLB LEXIS 11, Bulletin No. 478
(Jul. 2000).
President Bush recently increased IRS resources to combat “failure by employers to turn
over taxes withheld from paychecks or even to withhold them . . . .” See David Cay Johnston,
Budget Gives I.R.S. More Money to Investigate Tax Cheats, N.Y. TIMES, February 5, 2003, at A17.
171. See TAX ADMINISTRATION: EMPLOYMENT TAX, supra note 170, at 1. (“[W]hen confronted
with a choice between paying necessary operating expenses or depositing employment taxes,
struggling businesses may opt to pay business expenses instead of taxes.”); ABA Commission
Report, supra note 3, at 367 (“It is tempting for the business owner in such desperate straits to view
employee tax withholdings as an interest-free loan that will be paid back once business turns
around.”); Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978) (“the funds accumulated during the
quarter can be a tempting source of ready cash to a failing corporation beleaguered by creditors.”);
cf. Guttman, supra note 4, at 37 (“Much of the $280 billion [in IRS accounts receivable] is
uncollectible because the taxpayers are in bankruptcy and the IRS is unlikely to collect the funds.”).
Small businesses are those that experience a quarterly accumulation of funds:
Employers with the smallest employment tax liabilities pay on a quarterly basis; those
with the largest liabilities pay the next banking day; and those with intermediate-sized
liabilities pay on a monthly or more frequent basis. Generally, small businesses would
tend to be heavily concentrated in the employment tax deposit categories calling for less
frequent payments.
TAX ADMINISTRATION: EMPLOYMENT TAX, supra note 170, at 2.
In 2000, 19% of employers owed employment taxes quarterly, 52% owed them monthly,
and 29% owed the taxes more frequently than monthly. Id. at 11 tbl. 1. In 2000, quarterly payments
were required for those who owe less than $1,000 in employment taxes each quarter, monthly
payments were required for those who owe between $1,000 and $50,000 annually, and payments
were due more frequently and depending on the frequency of payments to employees, for other
employers. Id. at 11. However, beginning January 1, 2001, the threshold for quarterly payments was
raised from under $1,000 per quarter to under $2,500 per quarter. Id. at 11-12. That stood to
increase the portion of employers making quarterly payments to approximately 37%. Id. at 12.
172. See TAX ADMINISTRATION: EMPLOYMENT TAX, supra note 170, at 1–2 (discussing the
problems that compounding tax liabilities pose to businesses). There is a time-sensitive late
payment penalty, I.R.C. § 6651, a failure to deposit penalty, id. § 6656, and interest runs from the
day the payment was due, id. § 6601(a). Payment ends this cycle but may be impossible for a failing
business. This reality increases that the pressure on the IRS to act as promptly as possible but also
places it in an extremely difficult situation politically.
173. TAX ADMINISTRATION: EMPLOYMENT TAX, supra note 170, at 15–16.
174. Id. at 4. Currently, the IRS is very dependent on employer filing of quarterly returns to spot
noncompliance: “Although employment taxes for many employers must be paid throughout a
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IRS may benefit from taking a sterner approach sooner, at least in some
cases.176
IV. CONCLUSION
RRA ’98 focused primarily on service and procedural reform, not
compliance. Not surprisingly, the mandates of the legislation resulted in
a shift of IRS resources from enforcement to service.177 The data
included in Part I of this article showed a decline in enforcement activity
following passage of RRA ’98. However, more important for overall

calendar quarter, IRS’ ability to determine whether employers have paid as frequently as required
and in the amounts required is dependent on employers filing the Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax
Return (Form 941 return)” because the IRS matches its deposit records with the information reported
on the return. Id. at 2. An employer’s failure to file a Form 941 significantly delays the IRS’s initial
contact, extending it from on average 5 weeks after the delinquency arises to approximately 14-28
weeks after the delinquency, with the variation due to the fact that the IRS’s workload varies during
the year. Id. The increase over the 5-week turn-around time is because the IRS processes filed
returns first. Id. at 3. Therefore, the IRS may take longer to pursue those least inclined to pay the
overdue taxes.
175. “The payment of employment taxes accounts for over $500 billion of the federal budget and
is a large part of our voluntary tax system.” DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MAJOR
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FACING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR 2001,
available at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/armey-fy01-challenges.pdf (last visited September 16, 2003).
Employment taxes comprise about a third of total tax collections. MANAGEMENT ADVISORY
REPORT: COMPLIANCE, supra note 67, at 12.
176. It may also help for the IRS to increase the speed of enforcement when employer payments
are late. The ABA Commission on Taxpayer Compliance recommended this in 1988. See ABA
Commission Report, supra note 3, at 332, 368 (recommending early enforcement methods in order
to reinforce compliance). Admittedly, this is very hard—perhaps politically impossible in the
current climate—if collecting the taxes will shut down the business. “There is a tendency for the
media to depict the Service in such cases as somehow victimizing the business and causing it to fail.
But, in fact, the business had already failed; the theft of employee withholdings only postpones the
day of reckoning, at substantial cost to the public treasury.” Id. at 367. To collect taxes, the IRS
cannot be the creditor exerting the least pressure on the business. James Andreoni has argued that
“[t]ax evasion . . . may be a high-risk substitute for a loan.” James Andreoni, The IRS as Loan
Shark: Tax Compliance with Borrowing Constraints, 49 J. PUB. ECON. 35, 36 (1992). However, if
the IRS poses a toothless threat, the risk is not high at all. Faster action could prompt failing
businesses to take more appropriate actions, such as cutting expenses. Cf. ABA Commission Report,
supra note 3, at 367 (“Noncompliant taxpayers are usually failing businesses that cannot obtain
credit and are unwilling to make hard business decisions such as cutting expenses, laying off
workers, or declaring bankruptcy.”). A general education campaign about the teeth in employment
tax enforcement might also discourage using the IRS as an involuntary lender.
Another possible way to increase compliance with respect to the payment of trust fund
taxes would be for Congress to require more frequent employment tax payments, particularly for
small or start-up businesses. Of course, increasing the frequency of payments also increases
compliance costs, which can be a particular hardship for these businesses.
177. See Murphy & Higer, supra note 58, at 872 n.19 (“[F]rom 1990 to 2000, the number of fulltime equivalent employees at the IRS decreased from 111,962 to 97,071.”) (citing IRS Oversight
Board Annual Report (Jan. 2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 22-24); see also supra note 66-68 and
accompanying text.
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revenue than the direct effect of enforcement activity on enforcement
revenue is the effect, if any, on voluntary compliance.178
The data in Part I show that total federal revenue steadily increased
between 1997 and 2001179 and outpaced inflation.180 However, those
figures do not show what portion of taxes due actually were collected. If
taxes due increased at a greater rate than taxes collected, then compliance
rates have declined. Once the results of the new National Research
Program are analyzed,181 there will be current data on voluntary
compliance that can be compared to the data from 1988, the last TCMP,
the source of the estimate of an 83% overall rate of voluntary
compliance.
In the meantime, there is some—perhaps limited—cause for concern.
First, the General Accounting Office reported that between 1996 and
2001, “the number of apparent individual nonfilers increased about three
and one-half times faster than the individual tax filing population.”182
Yet, other data show that rates of timely filing by individuals
increased steadily between 1996 and 2000.183 Second, the IRS Oversight
Board conducted a survey in August 2001 that contained two questions
from a 1999 IRS survey and three new questions. One of the repeated
questions was “how much, if any, do you think is an acceptable amount
to cheat on your income taxes?” In 1999, 87% responded “not at all”
while in 2001, only 76% chose that answer.184 The importance of these
178. See supra text accompanying note 34.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
180. $1,505 billion in 1997 is equivalent to approximately $1,661.15 billion in 2001.
See Columbia Journalism Review Dollar Conversion Calculator, at http://www.cjr.org/resources/
inflater.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2003). The IRS actually collected $1,902.1 billion in 2001. See
supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
181. See Brown & Mazur, supra note 13, at 1268 (data from NRP should start to become
available to IRS in 2004); Amy Hamilton, IRS Set to Begin Random Audits of Taxpayers (Oct. 29,
2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 209-1. (In late October, 2002, IRS was preparing to begin the first of the
random audits under the NRP, but most of the audits would take during the 2003 filing season).
182. Tax Administration: Continued Progress Modernizing IRS Depends on Managing Risks
(May 14, 2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 94-17.
183. See Brown & Mazur, supra note 13, at 1259 (showing increase in rates of timely individual
income tax filing from 88.1% in 1996 to 90.7% in 2000).
184. IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (Feb. 1, 2002),
LEXIS, 2002 TNT 22-24 [hereinafter IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD 2001 REPORT]. The answer choices
were “Not at all,” “A little here and there,” “As much as possible,” and “Don’t know/not sure.” Id.
It is unclear from the Oversight Board’s report whether the surveys were given in person, by
telephone, or by mail. Id. However, the New York Times reported that the survey consisted of 1990
in-person interviews of adults. As Audits Decline, Fewer Taxpayers Balk at a Bit of Cheating, N.Y.
TIMES Jan. 19, 2002, A11. The margin of error was plus or minus 3 percentage points. Id.
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results should not be exaggerated,185 but they are consistent with a
possible relationship between decreased enforcement and a weaker
normative commitment to tax compliance.
Unfortunately, the media focus on horror stories and the need to
“reform” the IRS may suggest to taxpayers that IRS personnel have
found that they need to “abuse” taxpayers in order to collect from them.
This may tend to suggest that noncompliance is rampant, which, in turn,
may tend to undermine normative commitments to compliance.186 The
Congressionally declared need for reform also may breed fear and
mistrust of the IRS.187
Will the reformed IRS increase the rate of voluntary compliance?
Thus far, published studies on the link between tax collector friendliness
and compliance have not focused on the effects of RRA ’98. The
available empirical evidence discussed above does not tend to support a
connection between service to taxpayers and compliance.188 More
185. The IRS Oversight Board was appropriately cautious about concluding too much from one
survey. IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD 2001 REPORT, supra note 184. It stated its plan to repeat the
survey in 2002. Id.
186. See Lederman, supra note 14.
187. RRA ’98 may reflect a fundamental ambivalence about the IRS. On the one hand, we want
the IRS to catch tax cheats so that the rest of us do not pay more than our fair share (what former
Commissioner Rossotti called “service to all taxpayers”). STRATEGIC PLANS AND BUDGET, supra
note 49, at 14 (remarks of then-Commissioner Rossotti) (listing “Service to All Taxpayers,” as a
goal and in that category, “Increase fairness of compliance” and “Increase overall compliance”). On
the other hand, we worry about the possibilities of abuse by an agency with such power (which is
part of what former Commissioner Rossotti called “service to each taxpayer”). See id. (listing
“Service to Each Taxpayer” as a goal and among items in that category, “Ensure taxpayer rights are
observed”).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 103–116. In fact, IRS reform may be a way to tie the
hands of the IRS so as to increase support for elimination of the federal income tax. See, e.g.,
STRATEGIC PLANS AND BUDGET, supra note 49, at 1 (remarks of Rep. Archer) (“While the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act is landmark legislation, it is only a first step. Ultimately, I believe
that the true answer is to provide America with a new tax system—one that is fairer, simpler, less
intrusive, less costly, and that creates more economic growth.”); 143 CONG. REC. E2306 (daily ed.
Nov. 10, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Riley) (“I think a recent Newsweek Magazine article said it best:
The IRS has too much muscle, too much money, and too little oversight. The agency is out of
control and it is not going to fix itself. Only Congress can do that. In my view, we should overhaul—
if not eventually abolish—the IRS. Then we should scrap the Tax Code and replace it with one that
is fairer and flatter.”); 143 CONG. REC. E2319 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1997) (statement of Rep. Sandlin)
(“These reforms [in H.R. 2676] are only the first step in our struggle to reduce the impact of Federal
taxes on taxpayer’s lives. The real problem is the several thousand page Tax Code, created by
Congress, that the IRS attempts to administer. This year alone, Congress added 600 pages to the
Code by passing $85 billion in tax cuts. When a tax cut makes the Tax Code more complex, you
know it is time to scrap this Code and start over with one that is simple, fair, and understandable.”);
143 CONG. REC. E2204 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Weldon) (“I am proud to support
this important legislation [The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997], but
it is only a first step in the critical process of tax reform. We in the Congress must not rest until the
tax code is made fairer, flatter, and simpler for the American taxpayer. Americans pay too much in
taxes, and are forced to spend too much of their time filing out their returns. A flat tax would both
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research is needed on whether there is a relationship between the tone of
IRS communications and compliance.189 However, the literature on
procedural fairness suggests a possible link between the perceived
fairness of tax collection procedures and tax compliance. Additional
research would help show to what extent that applies to the IRS. Yet,
regardless of the findings, an important lesson of IRS reform may be that
IRS employees should act courteously and professionally in conducting
enforcement activities.190 Certainly overzealous, unprofessional behavior
can foment taxpayer resistance.191

reduce the tax burden on working Americans and make the process of paying taxes much simpler.
The surest way to bring the IRS under control is to make it less important. A flat tax will help us
reach this important goal.”).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 156–168.
190. This is true in part because some audits uncover no evidence of misreporting and because
taxpayers may form their strongest impressions about the IRS from personal interactions with its
employees.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 128–132.

